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ABSTRACT
Individuals and communities make choices affecting the risk of
accidental death. Individuals balance risk and cost in market choic-
es, for example, by purchasing costly safety products or taking a
dangerous job for higher pay. Communities balance risk and cost
through social norms of precaution, which prescribe how much risk
people may impose on others and on themselves. For example, social
norms dictate that bicyclists should wear helmets and automobile
passengers should wear seat belts. In both cases, the balance be-
tween the fatality risk and the cost of reducing it reveals an implicit
value of a statistical life, or VSL an individual market VSL in
the former case, and a community VSL in the latter instance. This
Article explores the theoretical differences between community and
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market VSLs, provides average dollar values for both, and endorses
the use of community VSLs in tort (as a measure of damages) and
in the regulatory context (as an input to cost-benefit analyses).
Our analysis of existing empirical studies reveals an average com-
munity VSL of roughly $2-3 million significantly smaller in value
than market VSLs, which average roughly $7 million. After pres-
enting and explaining these figures, we argue that courts and
regulators should base the legal value of a life on the community
value. The principal reasons for adopting community VSLs are va-
lidity and consistency. Community VSLs are a valid measure of the
implicit value of life because they are derived from social norms,
which embody the collective preferences and ideals of communities
as refined over time. At a minimum, they are more reliable and
meaningful measures of the value of life than the current legal alter-
natives: in tort, the unaided intuition of jurors and, in the regulatory
context, individual labor-market decisions made with limited
information. Community VSLs would also increase internal consis-
tency in tort, by linking the calculation of damages to the same
community-centric standards already used to determine reasonable
precaution. If adopted in the regulatory context and in tort law,
community VSLs would place both mechanisms of risk regulation on
the same, valid foundation.
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INTRODUCTION
Individuals routinely trade off money and risk through market
choices, such as when they decide to purchase costly automobile
safety features or consider whether to accept risky jobs for extra
pay. These choices reveal an implicit value of the goodsin this
case, healthbeing protected. Communities reveal collective values
of life and limb in a different way: using social norms of precaution
or rules that prescribe how much time, money, or energy that
people ought to sacrifice to reduce risks. For example, social norms
dictate that individuals should wear seat belts, that bicyclists
should use helmets, and that drivers should adhere, at least
roughly, to speed limits. As with individual actions, social norms
balance the cost of precaution and the reduction in the risk of harm
in each case, thereby revealing an implicit community valuation of
the harm at risk. When the risks in question are fatal, social norms
of precaution imply community values of a statistical life, or
community VSLs. Individual safety decisions regarding fatal risks
yield what we call market VSLs. 
To date, the economic and legal literature has ignored the impor-
tant distinction between community and market VSLs. By merging
the economics of damages with the study of social norms, this
Article compares average dollar values for community and market
VSLs and explores the theoretical differences between them.
Ultimately, we endorse the use of community VSLs in legal contexts
in which the valuation of life is necessary, either for remedial
purposes or the setting of precautionary or regulatory standards.
Our first observation is empirical. After reorganizing the exist-
ing VSL literature to account for the community/market distinction,
we find a significant difference in magnitude between community
and market VSLs. Based on the small pool of existing VSL studies
that reflect community judgments about risk, we find that commu-
nity VSLs average approximately $2-3 million. Market VSLs, by
contrast, center around $7 million. In terms of magnitude, commu-
nity VSLs fall between the values of life determined though tort
litigation (which average under $1 million and vary widely) and
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those used in the regulatory context (which are derived from
market VSLs and commonly range $5-7 million).
After discussing the relative magnitudes of community and mar-
ket VSLs, we make the theoretical case for using community VSLs
as a measure of tort damages. In determining legal fault or reason-
able care in tort cases, courts often rely on a community standard
of care. In determining damages, however, courts do not appear to
rely on the community valuation of harm. Judge Hands famous
equation (B = P x L)1 explicitly links, and balances, the costs of
precaution and the expected harm associated with an activity.
Though the rule is typically conceived as a way to compute the legal
standard of care in the absence of an accepted community standard,
the rule can also be used to estimate appropriate damages in the
presence of a clear community standard.2 Community VSLs are the
result of applying the Hand Rule in the latter fashion, with social
norms supplying the values of the B and P terms. For example,
if social norms dictate that children should wear bicycle helmets,
then the cost and risk reduction associated with using helmets
would reveal appropriate damages for a child killed or injured by
tortious activity. If the full cost of using a bicycle helmet, including
both the cost and disutility of wearing it, is $100, and the helmet
reduces the risk of death by 1/10,000, community damages in the
case of wrongful death would be $1 million (the ratio of cost to
marginal risk reduction).
If adopted in tort law as a measure of damages, community VSLs
would prove useful for several reasons. First, social norms of
precaution provide a more meaningful valuation of harm than the
unaided intuition of juries. The type of norms considered here as a
plausible basis for community VSLs are more than mere behavioral
1. In the Hand Rule equation, B represents the marginal cost of precaution, P re-
flects the marginal reduction in the likelihood of injury given the investment in precaution,
and L stands for the magnitude of harm. See, e.g., United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159
F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947). The full equation, discussed more fully in Part II, thus conveys
the notion that reasonable precaution is that which is cost-justified given the expected harm.
See id. at 174.
2. The authors have used the term Hand Rule Damages to refer to these types of
damages in prior, related work. Robert Cooter, Hand Rule Damages for Incompensable
Losses, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1097, 1099 (2003); see also Robert Cooter & David DePianto,
Damages for Incompensable Harms, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF TORTS
439, 439 (Jennifer Arlen ed., 2013).
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patterns or average behaviors; rather, they are collective agree-
ments, refined over time, about what behaviors are acceptable and
what behaviors warrant the imposition of informal social sanctions.
Second, because community VSLs rely exclusively on risk/money
tradeoffs that are backed by well-accepted social norms, they fit
seamlessly within the current rules on tort. The reasonable per-
son takes her cues from the community,3 and when the community
dictates certain precautions through social norms, it also provides
an implicit valuation of the harm at risk. The more precaution the
community requires, the greater the communitys valuation of the
harm at risk, and vice versa.
When courts determine both negligence and damages by refer-
ence to community standards (social norms), damages and precau-
tionary standards align with each other, and potential injurers
receive clear signals about the consequences of their activities.
Rationally self-interested actors would respond to community VSLs
by conforming to community standards of conduct.4 In contrast,
when legal standards and damages are misaligned, potential
injurers receive contradictory signals about their activities.5 Setting
legal damages at values lower than community damages incen-
tivizes potential injurers to violate community standards; similarly,
setting legal damages at values greater than community damages
incentivizes potential injurers to over-perform relative to commu-
nity standards.
Incentives aside, many people think that fairness demands align-
ment between safety standards and damages.6 In terms of safety
3. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL
HARM § 13 (AM. LAW INST. 2010). Though custom is not dispositive on the issue of reasonable
care, we discuss in Part II why the norms that underlie community VSLs would likely be
strong evidence of reasonable precaution.
4. See infra Part III.
5. See Ariel Porat, Misalignments in Tort Law, 121 YALE L.J. 82, 135-36 (2011). Porat
analyzes misalignments between the risk of liability and the risk used to set the standard
of care. He writes that misalignments occur when the risks that are accounted for in setting
the standard of care are different from the risks for which liability is imposed and damages
are awarded. Id. at 84. We discuss the misalignment between the risks used to set the
community standard of care and the damages imposed for accidents caused by its violation.
In brief, we discuss the misalignment when different values are used in the Hand Rule
equation to determine breach and damages.
6. See TOMR.TYLER,WHYPEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 172 (2006) (citing procedural fairness
as a primary motivation for compliance with legal rules).
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standards and liability, it seems fair for the violation to reflect the
same valuations of harm. Conversely, it seems unfair for injurers
to face low liability for violating serious social norms, or for injurers
to face high liability for violating minor social norms. Accordingly,
either damage awards must be adjusted to align with social norms
or social norms must be adjusted to align with damages. Because
social norms are already used in tort as guides for reasonable
precaution, and because norms are more reliable than jury guesses
as to the value of life, we suggest that damages should adjust to
social norms.7
Using community VSLs in tort would have two noteworthy prac-
tical consequences for tort damages. First, by supplying a coherent
rationale for estimating damages in wrongful death cases, com-
munity-based damages would make damages for fatal accidents
more uniform. Second, based on our initial empirical findings, using
community VSLs would increase damages for wrongful death by
multipliers of two to three.8 Implementing community damages
would therefore incentivize more care, less risky activity, or both,
leading to fewer fatal accidents.
The argument for community VSLs can be extended to the regu-
latory context, though a full defense of this point is beyond the
scope of this Article. Like tort law, safety regulations impose
standards of precaution on risky activities. We argue that the
communitys implicit valuation of fatal risks is a more meaningful
measure of the value of life than the market VSLs that are cur-
rently used in determining the economic feasibility of safety regula-
tions. Replacing market values with community values would
significantly reduce the regulatory value of a statistical life, from
the commonly cited average of roughly $7 million,9 which is based
on market VSL, to approximately $2-3 million.10 After this change,
7. Of course, if communities decide to alter social norms after observing the implicit
values of life (and the damage awards) they imply, damages would be reduced accordingly.
This educational aspect of community VSLstheir ability to convey publicly the implicit
values of life associated with norms of precaution, and thereby refine social normsis yet
another reason to adopt community VSLs in tort.
8. See infra Part II.
9. See, e.g., W. Kip Viscusi & Joseph E. Aldy, The Value of a Statistical Life: A Critical
Review of Market Estimates Throughout the World, 27 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 5, 18, 63
(2003).
10. See infra Table 3.
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safety regulations would tolerate more fatal accidentsthe opposite
effect of adopting community damages in tort. If community values
were adopted in both the regulatory context and in tort, the stan-
dards of care in both areas would converge. Such a convergence
would be an economically desirable result, since tort liability and
regulations apply to the same type of accidents and activities (or
close substitutes). Conversely, awarding damages for tortious death
of less than $2 million contradicts valuing a statistical life at over
$6 million when setting the applicable regulatory standard. The
current regulatory practice of using market VSLs to set safety stan-
dards causes them to diverge from community standards in tort
law.
The remainder of this Article is organized as follows. Part I
provides background on the economic approach to tort damages.
Part II gathers empirical estimates from the VSL literature and
compares community VSLs with their market counterparts. This
Part also gives a detailed account of community VSLs, their rela-
tionship with social norms, and their desirability as a basis for
determining legal valuations of life. Part III makes the economic
case for community damages in cases of wrongful death and in
regulation. The Article concludes by offering some general thoughts
on the source of the divergence in magnitude between community
and market VSLs.
I. THE ECONOMICS OF TORT DAMAGES (AND ITS INCOHERENCE AS
APPLIED TO FATAL INJURIES)
From an economic perspective, making an injured party whole
for economic losses is straightforward: simply award damages that
reflect the market value lost due to the injury.11 Tortious behavior
resulting in the destruction of a car, for example, would yield
11. Compensatory damagesthe most common form of damages issued in tort cases and
the subject of this inquiryare intended to restore the injured party, by way of monetary
transfers, as closely as possible to their pre-loss state. There are various alternative ways to
express the compensatory ideal, most of which are used interchangeably by courts, lawyers,
and scholars: making the victim (or, in the case of wrongful death, the victims estate)
whole, restoring the victim to the status quo ante, or, in economic terms, awarding an
amount of money such that the victim is indifferent between no injury and injury-plus-
damages. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 253 (6th ed. 2012).
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damages equal to the market value of the car. The victim can use
market damages to purchase a substitute that restores his former
position. Also, by forcing injurers to internalize the costs of their
risky activities, compensatory damages that equal the market price
of replaceable goods give injurers efficient incentives for precau-
tion.12 Though certain types of economic damage are more difficult
to calculate than othersfor example, reductions in earning capac-
ity and destruction of unique or sentimental itemseconomic
damages are relatively easy to calculate and relatively uncontrover-
sial compared to noneconomic damages.
The problem is far more complex, however, when the market does
not supply any clear guidance regarding the value of the injury.
Tort cases, of course, frequently involve injuries that are not easily
expressible in terms of market value. Serious bodily injuries and
death arising from negligence are commonplace, thus necessitating
a method for calculating appropriate damages across a wide spec-
trum of physical impairment, not to mention pain, suffering, and
death.13 Most people, however, have no idea what compensation
means for death of a loved one or for serious bodily injury. As
discussed below, although compensation for economic harms makes
perfect sense, compensation for noneconomic harms makes little
sense to most jurors.
As we have written before, [e]conomics represents perfect com-
pensation by using curves of constant utility. If two outcomes lie on
the same curve, an individual is indifferent between them.14 For
example, Figure 1 represents an individuals indifference between
differing, offsetting amounts of two distinct goods, in this case
health (H) and wealth (W). The individual in Figure 1 would be
indifferent between more health and less wealth (H0, W0), and less
heath and more wealth (H1, W1), at least as those options exist on
the individuals curve of constant utility. Generally, [i]ndifference
12. See generally id.
13. Noneconomic damageswhich cover various types of pain and suffering, including
emotional distress, mental anguish, shock, fright, loss of consortium, loss of capability, and
loss of enjoyment of life (so-called hedonic losses)constitute a significant portion of
damage awards for physical injury and death. See, e.g., Neil Vidmar et al., Jury Awards for
Medical Malpractice and Post-Verdict Adjustment of Those Awards, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 265,
265-66 (1998).
14. Cooter & DePianto, supra note 2, at 442-43.
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curves are useful in representing damages because perfect compen-
sation should, at least theoretically, make the injured party indif-
ferent between their pre-injury state and their post-injury state.15
Thus, Figure 1 demonstrates that an injury with a decrease in
health of (H0-H1) would be perfectly compensated with a damage
award of (W1-W0).
Figure 1. Indifference Curve16
15. Id.
16. Excerpted from id. at 443.
2016] COMMUNITY VERSUS MARKET VALUES OF LIFE 723
Indifference curves are inapplicable to the analysis of death and
serious bodily injury, however, because these preferences are incom-
plete.17 Preferences are incomplete when some points are incompa-
rable to others.18 When two points are incomparable, the person
cannot say whether one is preferred to the other, or whether he is
indifferent between them.19 As demonstrated by Figure 1, incom-
plete preferences imply that holes exist in the utility curves.20
Incomplete preferences sometimes result from inexperience.21
Most people have no opportunity to buy or sell non-market goods,
so they do not think about the dollar value of such goods.22 Prefer-
ences for unfamiliar things are often incomplete, but people can
often complete them when circumstances demand a choice. Thus,
for example, most individuals can figure out how to rank mobile
phones when they need to buy one. Similarly, if required by cir-
cumstances, many people could presumably put a dollar value on
suffering from the flu. Individuals might even be able to rank a life
with slightly poorer vision against one with slightly poorer hearing,
even though attaching dollar values to these physical impairments
would be very difficult. As these bodily injuries become more
serious, monetizing and comparing them becomes more difficult.
Valuing serious bodily injury or death differs from valuing minor
impairments in two ways. First, ones experience is inevitably lim-
itedno one experiences his own death twice and few people suffer
severe injury multiple times. When confronted with impending
death or serious injury, few people have the opportunity to buy
their way out. Second, many people refuse to even engage in this
line of thought. Many individuals will not contemplate having to
choose whether their eldest or youngest child should die. They fo-
cus on avoiding such a choice, not figuring out how to make it. As
a result, most people would be hard-pressed to find a money-equiv-
alent for the death of a child. They focus on avoiding circumstances
in which they would have to choose between money and life.
17. Id. at 443-44.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. See Philip J. Cook & Daniel A. Graham, The Demand for Insurance and Protection:
The Case of Irreplaceable Commodities, 91 Q.J. ECON. 143, 144 (1977).
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In such cases, individual preferences are incomplete. Many indi-
viduals cannot complete preferences over death and serious bodily
injury, because completing them would violate a moral or religious
taboo that prohibits such a tradeoff.23 Whether the obstacle is inex-
perience, psychology,24 religion, or ethics,25 most people have
incomplete preferences concerning death and bodily injury, meaning
23. For more information on taboo preferences, see Philip E. Tetlock, Social Functionalist
Frameworks for Judgment and Choice: Intuitive Politicians, Theologians, and Prosecutors,
109 PSYCHOL. REV. 451, 454 (2002).
24. According to psychologists, people erect boundaries between some categories of
thought and they struggle to cross these boundaries. Id. at 451. Recent work in psychology,
building on older traditions in sociology, suggests that different circumstances trigger
different orientations toward the world. See id. Some circumstances trigger the intuitive
scientists inside us, who seek causal understanding and predictive leverage. Id. Other
circumstances trigger our intuitive economists, whose goal is to maximize subjective
utility. Id. People also act as intuitive politicians and intuitive prosecutors. Id. at 452.
The finding most relevant to incompensable harms is that some people act as intuitive
theologians. Id. at 453. This orientation forbids taboo trade-offs. Id. at 459. In other words:
[O]ur commitments to other people require us to deny that we can compare
certain thingsin particular, things of finite value to things that our moral
community insists on formally treating as possessing transcendental or infinite
significance. To transgress this boundary, to attach a monetary value to ones
friendships, children, or loyalty to ones country, is to disqualify oneself from
the accompanying social roles. Constitutive incommensurability can thus be
said to exist whenever comparing values subverts one of the values (the
putatively infinitely significant value) in the trade-off calculus. Taboo trade-offs
are, in this sense, morally corrosive.
Philip E. Tetlock, The Virtues of Cognitive Humility: For Us as Well as Them, in JUDGMENTS,
DECISIONS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 355, 358 (Rajeev Gowda & Jeffrey C. Fox eds., 2002).
The intuitive theologian may often encounter incompensable harms because some people
have religious objections to comparing death or bodily injury to money. See Tetlock, supra
note 23, at 454. Attempts to reduce sacred values to money equivalents often cause
indignation in people who assume the moralist-theologian orientation. Id. Asking them how
much money they would need to accept death or serious injury resembles asking some
Catholics how much they would charge to curse Saint Cecilia.
25. Like religion, some philosophies treat money as incommensurable with death or
bodily injury. See Margaret Jane Radin, Compensation and Commensurability, 43 DUKE L.J.
56, 62 (1993); Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REV.
779, 798 (1994). In philosophy, principles sometimes preclude prices. Philosophers have
especially debated incommensurability as part of the clash between deontic and utilitarian
ethics. See Radin, supra, at 65. Some philosophies object to reducing death or injury to money
much like they object to reducing rights to utility. Id. Joseph Raz, for example, addresses the
issue through the concept of constitutive incommensurabilit[y]. JOSEPHRAZ,THEMORALITY
OF FREEDOM 346 (1986). According to Raz, the monetization of values such as love leads to
indignation because incommensurability is itself a qualification for having certain relations.
Id. at 351. In other words, the act of reducing certain relations to money precludes our
participation in them. Id. That is why money cannot buy love.
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that they do not know how to equate them with money. Conse-
quently, the compensation principles applied in tort litigation
which require juries to estimate damages so as to make the injured
party whole or place them in a pre-injury positionare incoherent
as applied to death and serious bodily injury.
A. Damage Estimation in Court: The Current Process
Notwithstanding the above points, courts still appeal to unaided
juror intuition and the concept of compensation when estimating
damages for death and serious bodily injury. A small sampling of
the language used to instruct juries on the issue of damages
illustrates the difficulty of the task and the wide discretion afforded
to juries in determining the legal value of a life. A juror faced with
the challenge of assessing damages for wrongful death in Califor-
nia, for example, might be asked to draw upon his common sense
to arrive at an amount in current dollars paid at the time of
judgment that will compensate the estate for the loss, including
the reasonable value of household services arising from the
death.26 A prefatory note to this portion of the instructions asserts
that [n]o fixed standard exists for deciding the amount of noneco-
nomic damages.27 Jury instructions from several other jurisdictions
contain similar disclaimers.28
Missouri and Massachusetts fare no better in terms of clarity.
Missouri charges its juries with the task of estimating such sum as
you believe will fairly and justly compensate plaintiff for any dam-
ages sustained as a result of a wrongful death.29 Massachusetts
instructions ask jurors to use [their] wisdom and judgment and
[their] sense of basic justice to translate into dollars and cents the
26. CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 3921 (ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS,
JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL. 2014).
27. Id.
28. See, e.g., PATTERN JURYINSTRUCTIONS (CIVILCASES)§ 15.3 (COMM. ONPATTERNJURY
INSTRUCTIONS, DIST. JUDGES ASSN, FIFTH CIRCUIT 2014); MISS. MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS
CIVIL § 11:5 (MISS. JUDICIAL COLL. 2014); STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONSCIVIL CASES
§ 501.2 (SUPREME COURT COMM. ON STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CIVIL CASES, FLA.
SUPREME COURT 2008); PATTERN INSTRUCTIONS KAN. 4TH CIVIL § 171.32 (CIVIL ADVISORY
COMM., KAN. JUDICIAL COUNCIL 2008).
29. MO. APPROVED JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CIVIL) § 5.01 (MO. SUPREME COURT COMM. ON
CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, MO. SUPREME COURT 2014).
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amount which will fully, fairly, and reasonably compensate the next
of kin for the death of the decedent.30
New York expressly bars recovery for noneconomic damages in
wrongful death cases.31 Notwithstanding this limitation on recov-
ery, New York jurors still face the daunting task of estimating,
among other things, the services that [the decedent] would have
performed for the survivors, the portion of (his, her) earnings that
[the decedent] would have spent in the future for the care and
support of the family, and the intellectual, moral, and physical
training, guidance and assistance that [the decedent] would have
given the children had (he, she) lived.32 How should a juror mone-
tize moral training? As this example shows, shifting the inquiry
from noneconomic terms to an expansive conception of economic
terms simplifies the jurors task only modestly, if at all.
B. Consequences of Incoherent Jury Instructions on Damages
Unsurprisingly, the jury instructions excerpted above, and others
like them, lead to inconsistent damage awards. While injury sever-
ity correlates positively with damage awardsmeaning that, as a
general matter, more serious injuries yield higher damages33
awards for similar injuries are highly variable. One study of jury
awards, drawing upon data from Florida and the Kansas City
metropolitan area, concludes:
Within an individual severity level, the highest valuation can be
scores of times larger than the lowest. Awards for the most seri-
ous permanent injuries ... range in value from a low of $147,000
to a high of $18,100,000. Even considering only the spread
between the top and bottom quartiles, the range is great. All the
awards in the top 25% of level 6 cases, for example, are at least
six times larger than any of the bottom 25%.34
30. MASS. SUPERIOR COURT CIVIL PRACTICE JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 3.5 (STEPHEN D.
ANDERSON ET AL. 2003).
31. N.Y. PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONSCIVIL § 2:320 (COMM. ON PATTERN JURY
INSTRUCTIONS, ASSN OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES OF THE STATE OF N.Y. 2014).
32. Id.
33. See, e.g., W. Kip Viscusi, Pain and Suffering in Product Liability Cases: Systematic
Compensation or Capricious Awards?, 8 INTL REV. L. & ECON. 203, 207 (1988).
34. Randall R. Bovbjerg et al., Valuing Life and Limb in Tort: Scheduling Pain and
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Damages for wrongful death also showed similar variability in
the above study: the 75th percentile award was double the value of
the median award and about six times the value of the 25th
percentile award.35 A different survey study in which respondents
were asked to estimate damages for hypothetical injuries reached
a similar result: A review of the awards for general damages for
each injury revealed that the highest award for some injuries was
more than five times as large as the second highest award.36 Other
empirical analyses echo the above conclusions regarding the in-
consistency and horizontal inequity among damage awards.37
The psychological literature on jury awards and decision making
suggests several reasons for inconsistent and variable damage
awards. First, as mentioned above, juries are not given detailed
guidance on how to translate injuries into dollars.38 Indeed, jury
instructions concede that there are no objective guidelines by
which you can measure the money equivalent of this element of
injury.39 Juries are asked to scale without a modulus, or deter-
mine appropriate compensation without anylimit or predetermined
range.40 Even if jurors agree on the general level of injury severity,
there is no uniform way to map the injury onto dollars.41
Absent a coherent guide for calculating damages, jurors appear
to rely on various bits of available informationoften irrelevant to
the compensatory inquiryto estimate damages. For example, dam-
age awards are influenced, or anchor[ed] at a starting point, by
numbers suggested by the parties lawyers.42 Jurors are also influ-
enced by whether the defendant is a corporation or an individual,
Suffering, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 908, 923 (1989).
35. See id. at 922.
36. Roselle L. Wissler et al., Decisionmaking About General Damages: A Comparison of
Jurors, Judges, and Lawyers, 98 MICH. L. REV. 751, 769 (1999).
37. See David W. Leebron, Final Moments: Damages for Pain and Suffering Prior to
Death, 64 N.Y.U.L.REV. 256, 324-25 (1989); Stephen D. Sugarman, A Comparative Law Look
at Pain and Suffering Awards, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 399, 399-400 (2006).
38. See Roselle L. Wissler et al., Instructing Jurors on General Damages in Personal
Injury Cases: Problems and Possibilities, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POLY & L. 712, 714 (2000).
39. Id. at 718; see also RONALD W. EADES, JURY INSTRUCTIONS ON DAMAGES IN TORT
ACTIONS § 6.17 (5th ed. 2015).
40. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., PUNITIVE DAMAGES: HOW JURIES DECIDE 42 (2002).
41. See Wissler et al., supra note 36, at 783-84.
42. See, e.g., Shari Seidman Diamond et al., Damage Anchors on Real Juries, 8 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 148, 149 (2011).
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the reprehensibilityof the underlying act, concerns about plaintiff s
attorney fees, and beliefs about the parties insurance coverage.43
Even the physical attractiveness, race, or gender of the parties can
impact awards.44
At best, the process of estimating appropriate compensation for
serious injuries and death is inconsistent; at worst, it is meaning-
less. Accordingly, the damage estimation process and its results
have led to controversy on all sides. Jurors are frustrated at the
lack of guidance provided to them.45 Legal commentators frequent-
ly bemoan noneconomic damages as one of the tort beasts uglier
heads.46 Victims believe that the judicial system offers little more
than jackpot justice,47 while injurers are unclear about their lia-
bility for risky activities.48 State governments, too, appear to have
little faith in juries abilities to estimate damages, and have
responded to these concerns with caps on general damage awards.49
II. COMMUNITY DAMAGES AND THE COMMUNITY VALUE OF LIFE
By asking judges or juries to find a sum of money that compen-
sates for death or serious bodily injury, the law requires them to
express preferences that most of them do not have. For these
harms, compensation makes no sense. Besides being incoherent,
asking jurors to compensate a family for the loss of a loved one may
43. See Wissler et al., supra note 36 at 794-95; Wissler et al., supra note 38, at 714.
44. See Leslie A. Zebrowitz & Susan M. McDonald, The Impact of Litigants Baby-
Facedness & Attractiveness on Adjudications in Small Claims Courts, 15LAW&HUM.BEHAV.
603, 604, 608 (1991).
45. See NEIL VIDMAR, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE AMERICAN JURY: CONFRONTING
THE MYTHS ABOUT JURYINCOMPETENCE,DEEP POCKETS, AND OUTRAGEOUS DAMAGE AWARDS
188-89 (1995); Edith Greene & Brian Bornstein, Precious Little Guidance, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB.
POLY & L. 743, 743 (2000).
46. Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, The Nonpecuniary Costs of Accidents: Pain-and-
Suffering Damages in Tort Law, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1785, 1789 (1995).
47. Timothy D. Lytton et al., Tort as Litigation Lottery: A Misconceived Metaphor, 52 B.C.
L. REV. 267, 276 (2011) (quoting Ted Frank, Thoughts on the Litigation Lottery, POINTOF
LAW.COM (July 11, 2005, 6:31 PM), http://www.pointoflaw.com/archives/001307.php [https://
perma.cc/DK7A-4HF5]).
48. See id. at 270.
49. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 09.17.010 (West 2015); CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2 (West
2015); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-102.5 (West 2015); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-19a02 (West
2014); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 11-108 (West 2015); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 600.1483 (West 2015); MO. ANN. STAT. § 538.210 (West 2014).
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seem offensive. Accordingly, courts should discard the language
they currently use to instruct jurors on compensation in cases of
death and serious bodily injury and tell jurors, clearly, how to
determine damages. Using community VSLs to determine damage
awards would accomplish both of these goals, as we explain below.50
Economists generally approach injury valuation by looking at the
costs of mitigating risk. When people confront the tradeoff between
risk and health in their everyday livesfor example, by investing
in costly product safety features, or taking a risky job for higher
paythey reveal something about the value of injuries (or, perhaps
more accurately, the value of injury avoidance). To illustrate: if an
individual pays $20 to reduce the risk of a head injury by 1/10,000,
the implicit value of entirely avoiding the injury would be, under
certain assumptions, $200,000.51
Valuations of life implied by tradeoffs between health and wealth
have at least two uses in law. In the regulatory context, VSLs are
used to determine if a proposed regulatory action is cost-justified.
For example, suppose that a clean water initiative would cost $100
million to implement and is expected to save 100 lives. Without
some dollar value to associate with a (saved) life, determining
whether the proposed regulation makes economic sense would be
impossible. However, if the implicit value of lifeas derived from
a VSL analysissuggests that a life is worth $2 million, the above
regulation would be cost-justified; the regulation would effectively
buy $200 million worth of lives for $100 million.
This regulatory application of VSL figures is relatively well ac-
cepted among scholars52 and routinely used in practice. Indeed, the
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) is required to
perform a cost-benefit analysis of all proposed regulations and uses
50. See infra Part II.A-B.
51. As noted frequently in the VSL literature, the phrase value of a statistical life is
something of a misnomer; it is not a direct valuation of the value of a particular or identified
life, but rather the sum of small, implicit valuations of fatality risks spread across a
population. See, e.g., Lisa Heinzerling, The Rights of Statistical People, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REV. 189, 189-90 (2000); Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Dollars and Death, 72 U. CHI.
L. REV. 537, 551 (2005).
52. But see, e.g., FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE
PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING 56-57 (2004).
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VSLs to do so as a matter of course.53 Table 1 lists some illustrative
values of life used by various regulatory agencies.
Table 1. Value of Statistical Life Used in Various Administrative
Rules54
Subject Regulation & Date Agency
VSL
(Millions,
2000 U.S. dol-
lars)
Federal Motor Vehi-
cle Safety Standards;
Roof Crush
Resistance
75 Fed. Reg. 17,605-01
(2010) (codified at 49
C.F.R. pt. 571)
National High-
way Traffic
Safety Adminis-
tration
5.8 million
Prevention of Salmo-
nella Enteritidis in
Shell Eggs During
Production, Storage,
and Transportation
74 Fed. Reg. 33,030-01
(2009) (codified at 21
C.F.R. pts. 15, 18)
Department of
Health and Hu-
man Services;
Food and Drug
Administration
5 million
Hazardous Materials:
Improving the Safety
of Railroad Tank Car
Transportation of
Hazardous Materials
73 Fed. Reg. 17,818-01
(2008) (codified at 49
C.F.R. pts. 171, 173, 174,
179)
Department of
Transportation;
Pipeline and
Hazardous Ma-
terials Safety
Administration
3.2-8.4 million
Use of Materials De-
rived from Cattle in
Medical Products
Intended for Use in
Humans and Drugs
Intended for Use in
Ruminants
72 Fed. Reg. 1582-01
(2007) (codified at
throughout 21 C.F.R.)
Department of
Health and Hu-
man Services;
Food and Drug
Administration
5.8 million
National Primary
Drinking Water Reg-
ulations: Ground Wa-
ter Rule
71 Fed. Reg. 65,574-01
(2006) (codified at 40
C.F.R. pts. 9, 141, 142)
Environmental
Protection
Agency
7.4 million
Control of Communi-
cable Diseases
70 Fed. Reg. 71,892-01
(2005) (codified at 42
C.F.R. pts. 70, 71)
Centers for
Disease Control
and Prevention;
6.9 million
53. See Cass R. Sunstein, The Real World of Cost-Benefit Analysis: Thirty-SixQuestions
(and Almost as Many Answers), 114 COLUM. L. REV. 167, 170, 181-82 (2014).
54. Excerpted from Cooter & DePianto, supra note 2, at 450.
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Department of
Health and
Human Services
National Primary
Drinking Water Reg-
ulations: Stage 2 Dis-
infectants and Disin-
fection Byproducts
Rule; National Pri-
mary and Secondary
Drinking Water Reg-
ulations: Approval of
Analytical Methods
for Chemical Con-
taminants
68 Fed. Reg. 49,548-01
(2003) (codified at 40
C.F.R. pts. 141, 142, 143)
Environmental
Protection
Agency
4.8 million
National Primary
Drinking Water Reg-
ulations: Long Term
2 Enhanced Surface
Water Treatment
Rule
68 Fed. Reg. 47,640-01
(2003) (codified at 40
C.F.R. pts. 141, 142)
Environmental
Protection
Agency
6.3 million
Financial Responsi-
bility Requirements
for Licensed Launch
Activities
63 Fed. Reg. 45,592-01
(1998) (codified at 14
C.F.R. pt. 440)
Department of
Transportation;
Federal
Aviation Admin-
istration
3 million
Before accidents occur, regulators use VSLs to determine safety
standards in the design and operation of dangerous activities. A
cost-benefit analysis using VSL determines ex ante how much care
is worth taking. The use of implicit values of life in the courtroom
to determine damages for death and serious injury seems equally
appropriate. In the judicial context, implicit values of life could be
used not to decide, ex ante, whether an action is worth taking, but
to provide ex post damages for individuals (or their estates) after an
injury has occurred. For example, if reliable estimates of the im-
plicit value of life center around $2 million, damage awards for
wrongful death would be $2 million.55 Our central argument is that
55. Importantly, the ex ante regulatory use of VSLs and the ex post remedial use of VSLs
conceptually merge once one realizes that, from the perspective of potential injurers,
standards of care in tort function much like regulations once they become enshrined in tort
law. This point is taken up in further detail below. See infra Part III.
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a particular type of VSL should be used to determine reasonable
compensation in tort casescommunity VSLs, not market VSLs.56
The Sections below distinguish between them and compare their
magnitudes.
A. Measuring Community and Market Values of Life Evidence
from Empirical Studies
In this Section, we provide illustrative statistical values of life
from the existing empirical literature. We did not generate these
data, but we organize them in a new way, making a critical distinc-
tion between community values of life and market values of life.
After reporting the two collections of VSL figuresand, impor-
tantly, showing the sharp difference in magnitude between market
VSLs and community VSLswe explain the community/market
distinction in more detail and defend the use of community VSLs in
tort and regulation.
Table 2 reflects a sampling of twenty-nine market VSLs, which
reflect decisions or tradeoffs that are not dictated by social norms.57
56. Objections to the use of implicit values of life as damage awards are discussed in Part
II.A.
57. Table 2 is composed of data from Table 2 appearing in Viscusi & Aldy, supra note 9,
at 19-21 (citing ROBERT STEWART SMITH, THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT: ITS
GOALS AND ITS ACHIEVEMENTS (1976); Richard J. Butler, Wage and Injury Rate Response to
Shifting Levels of Workers Compensation, in SAFETY AND THE WORK FORCE 61 (John D.
Worrall ed., 1983); Alan E. Dillingham & Robert S. Smith, Union Effects on the Valuation of
Fatal Risk, in INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS RESEARCH ASSOCIATION SERIES: PROCEEDINGS OF THE
THIRTY-SIXTH ANNUAL MEETING 270 (Barbara D. Dennis ed., 1984); V. Kerry Smith & Carol
C.S. Gilbert, The Valuation of Environmental Risks Using Hedonic Wage Models, in
HORIZONTAL EQUITY, UNCERTAINTY, AND ECONOMIC WELL-BEING 359 (Martin David &
Timothy Smeeding eds., 1985); Richard Thaler & Sherwin Rosen, The Value of Saving a Life:
Evidence from the Labor Market, in HOUSEHOLD PRODUCTIONAND CONSUMPTION 265 (Nestor
E. Terleckyj ed., 1975); W. Kip Viscusi, Occupational Safety and Health Regulation: Its
Impact and Policy Alternatives, in RESEARCH IN PUBLIC POLICY ANALYSIS AND MANAGEMENT
281 (John P. Crecine ed., 1981); Richard J. Arnould & Len M. Nichols, Wage-Risk Premiums
and Workers Compensation, 91 J. POL. ECON. 332 (1983); M.C. Berger & P.E. Gabriel, Risk
Aversion and the Earnings of US Immigrants and Natives, 23 APPLIED ECON. 311 (1991);
Charles Brown, Equalizing Differences in the Labor Market, 94 Q.J. ECON. 113 (1980); Alan
E. Dillingham, The Influence of Risk Variable Definition on Value-of-Life Estimates, 23 ECON.
INQUIRY 277 (1985); Peter Dorman & Paul Hagstrom, Wage Compensation for Dangerous
Work Revisited, 52 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 116 (1998); Stuart Dorsey & Norman Walzer,
Workers Compensation, Job Hazards, and Wages, 36 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 642 (1983);
John Garen, Compensating Wage Differentials and the Endogeneity of Job Riskiness, 70 REV.
ECON. & STAT. 9 (1988); Douglas Gegax et al., Perceived Risk and the Marginal Value of
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More specifically, the VSL numbers in Table 2 are based on trade-
offs between workplace risk and wages (or wage premiums). In
year-2000 dollars (inflation-adjusted), the range of estimates in
Table 2 is $500,000 to $20.8 million. Some studies report a range of
estimates from higher to lower, from which the reader can choose.
Using the higher estimates where a range is provided, the average
VSL in Table 1 is $8.48 million. Using the lowest estimate where a
range is provided, the average is $6.63 million. The values repre-
sented in Table 2 align with previous estimates of average market
VSLs,58 and, because most regulatory cost-benefit analyses use
Safety, 73 REV. ECON. & STAT. 589 (1991); Henry W. Herzog, Jr. & Alan M. Schlottmann,
Valuing Risk in the Workplace: Market Price, Willingness to Pay, and the Optimal Provision
of Safety, 72 REV. ECON. & STAT. 463 (1990); Thomas J. Kniesner & John D. Leeth,
Compensating Wage Differentials for Fatal Injury Risk in Australia, Japan, and the United
States, 4 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 75 (1991); J. Paul Leigh, Compensating Wages, Value of a
Statistical Life, and Inter-Industry Differentials, 28 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 83 (1995); J.
Paul Leigh, Gender, Firm Size, Industry, and Estimates of the Value-of-Life, 6 J. HEALTH
ECON. 255 (1987); J. Paul Leigh, No Evidence of Compensating Wages for Occupational
Fatalities, 30 INDUS. REL. 382 (1991); J. Paul Leigh & Roger N. Folsom, Estimates of the
Value of Accident Avoidance at the Job Depend on the Concavity of the Equalizing Differences
Curve, 24 Q. REV. ECON. & BUS. 56 (1984); John R. Lott, Jr. & Richard L. Manning, Have
Changing Liability Rules Compensated Workers Twice for Occupational Hazards?Earnings
Premiums and Cancer Risks, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 99 (2000); Stuart A. Low & Lee R.
McPheters, Wage Differentials and Risk of Death: An Empirical Analysis, 21 ECON. INQUIRY
271 (1983); Michael J. Moore & W. Kip Viscusi, Discounting Environmental Health Risks:
New Evidence and Policy Implications, 18 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 51 (1990); Michael J.
Moore & W. Kip Viscusi, Doubling the Estimated Value of Life: Results Using New
Occupational Fatality Data, 7 J. POLY ANALYSIS & MGMT. 476 (1988); Michael J. Moore &
W. Kip Viscusi, The Quantity-Adjusted Value of Life, 26 ECON. INQUIRY 369 (1988); Craig A.
Olson, An Analysis of Wage Differentials Received by Workers on Dangerous Jobs, 16 J.HUM.
RESOURCES 167 (1981); Robert S. Smith, The Feasibility of an Injury Tax Approach to
Occupational Safety, 38 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 730 (1974); V. Kerry Smith & Carol C.S.
Gilbert, The Implicit Valuation of Risks to Life, 16 ECON.LETTERS 393 (1984); W. Kip Viscusi,
Labor Market Valuations of Life and Limb: Empirical Evidence and Policy Implications, 26
PUB. POLY 359 (1978); W. Kip Viscusi & Michael J. Moore, Rates of Time Preference and
Valuations of the Duration of Life, 38 J.PUB.ECON. 297 (1989)). As in that Article, the figures
that populate the table have been converted to year-2000 U.S. dollars.
58. Our median estimated VSL from Table 2 is about $7 million [in year-2000 dollars],
which is in line with the estimates from the studies that we regard as most reliable. Viscusi
& Aldy, supra note 9, at 18. Also: The wage-risk studies have utilized data from the United
States as well as many other countries throughout the world. The primary implication of
these results is that estimates of the value of life in the U.S. are clustered in the $4 million
to $10 million range, with an average value of life in the vicinity of $7 million. Value of Life,
NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 587 (Steven N. Durlauf & Lawrence E. Blume
eds., 2d ed. 2008). Also: Controlling for measurement error, endogeneity, latent individual
heterogeneity possibly correlated with regressors, state dependence, and sample composition
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wage premium or labor market studies, the mean values in Tables
1 and 2 are similar.
Table 2. Market Values of Life (Tradeoffs Not Dictated by Social
Norms)
Author(s) (Year) Sample
VSL (millions, 2000
U.S. dollars)
Smith (1974)
Current Population Survey (CPS) 1967,
Census of Manufactures 1963, U.S. Census
1960, Employment and Earnings 1963
9.2
Thaler & Rosen
(1975)
Survey of Economic
Opportunity 1967
1.0
Smith (1976) CPS 1967, 1973 5.9
Viscusi (1978a,
1979)
Survey of Working Conditions (SWC),
1969-1970
5.3
Brown (1980)
National Longitudinal Survey of Young
Men 1966-71, 1973
1.9
Viscusi (1981)
Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID)
1976
8.3
Olson (1981) CPS 1978 6.7
Arnould & Nichols
(1983)
U.S. Census 1970 0.5, 1.3
Butler (1983) S.C. Workers Compensation Data 1940-69 1.3
Low & McPheters
(1983)
International City Management Associa-
tion 1976 (police officer wages)
1.4
Dorsey & Walzer
(1983)
CPS May 1978 11.8, 12.3
Leigh & Folsom
(1984)
PSID 1974; Quality of Employment Survey
(QES) 1977
10.1-13.3
Smith & Gilbert
(1984, 1985)
CPS 1978 0.9
Dillingham &
Smith (1984)
CPS May 1979 4.1-8.3
Dillingham (1985) QES 1977 1.2, 3.2-6.8
Leigh (1987) QES 1977; CPS 1977 13.3
Moore & Viscusi
(1988a)
PSID 1982 3.2, 9.4
yields VSL estimates of $4 million to $10 million. Thomas J. Kniesner et al., The Value of
a Statistical Life: Evidence from Panel Data, 94 REV. ECON. & STAT. 74, 74 (2012).
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Moore & Viscusi
(1988b)
QES 1977 9.7
Garen (1988) PSID 1981-1982 17.3
Viscusi & Moore
(1989)
PSID 1982 10.0
Herzog &
Schlottman (1990)
U.S. Census 1970 11.7
Moore & Viscusi
(1990b)
PSID 1982 20.8
Kniesner & Leeth
(1991)
CPS 1978 0.7
Gegax, Gerking &
Schulze (1991)
Authors mail survey 1984 2.1
Leigh (1991)
QES 1972-3, QES 1977, PSID 1974, 1981,
Longitudinal QES 1973-1977, CPS Janu-
ary 1977
7.1-15.3
Berger & Gabriel
(1991)
U.S. Census 1980 8.6, 10.9
Leigh (1995) PSID 1981, CPS January 1977, QES 1977 8.1-16.8
Dorman &
Hagstrom (1998)
PSID 1982 8.7-20.3
Lott & Manning
(2000)
CPS March 1971 and March 1985 1.5, 3.0 (2.0, 4.0)
Table 3 reports various community values of a statistical life:
VSL estimates for which the underlying tradeoff is dictated by so-
cial norms. The average community VSLusing the lowest values
where a range is provided without a preferred estimate, and includ-
ing VSLs for childrenis $1.65 million (again, in year-2000 U.S.
dollars). Excluding values for children, and again using the lowest
values where a range is given, yields an average community VSL of
$1.92 million. The mean community VSL using the highest value
where a range is given (and including VSLs for children) is $2.77
million. Finally, the mean community VSL excluding children and
using the highest value from the reported ranges is $2.62 million.
Importantly, whichever values one draws from the tables, market
VSLs, represented in Table 2, are significantly largerby as much
as three timesrelative to the community values, represented in
Table 3.
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Table 3. Community Values of Life (Tradeoffs Dictated by Social
Norms)59
Author(s) (Year) Activity/TradeoffUnderlying VSL
Implicit Value of Life
(millions, 2000 U.S. dollars)
Blomquist (1979) Seat Belt Usage 1.0
Dardis (1980) Smoke Detectors 0.77
Jondrow (1983) Speed Limits 1.12-1.84
Garbacz (1989)
Fatality Risks Without
Smoke Detectors
2.56
Carlin & Sandy
(1991)
Child Car Seat Purchase 0.8
Blomquist et al.
(1996) Seat Belt Usage
2.8-4.6 (average = 3.7)
3.7-6.0 (child under 5; average = 4.85)
1.7-2.8 (motorcycle riders; average = 2.25)
Jenkins et al.
(2001)
Bicycle Helmet
Usage/Purchase
1.4-2.9 (age 5-9; average = 2.15)
1.2-2.8 (age 10-14; average = 2)
2.1-4.3 (age 20-59; average = 3.2)
Ashenfelter &
Greenstone (2002) Speed Limits 1.7
Hakes & Viscusi
(2007)
Seat Belt Usage 2.32
van Benthem (2015) Speed Limits 3.16-4.34 (average = 3.75)
59. Some of the data in this table originally appeared in Viscusi & Aldy, supra note 9, at
25 (citing Glenn Blomquist, Value of Life Saving: Implications of Consumption Activity, 87
J. POL. ECON. 540 (1979); Glenn C. Blomquist et al., Values of Risk Reduction Implied by
Motorist Use of Protection Equipment, 30 J. TRANSPORT ECON. & POLY 55 (1996); Paul S.
Carlin & Robert Sandy, Estimating the Implicit Value of a Young Childs Life, 58 S. ECON.
J. 186 (1991); Rachel Dardis, The Value of a Life: New Evidence from the Marketplace, 70 AM.
ECON. REV. 1077 (1980); Christopher Garbacz, Smoke Detector Effectiveness and the Value
of Saving a Life, 31 ECON. LETTERS 281 (1989); Robin R. Jenkins et al., Valuing Reduced
Risks to Children: The Case of Bicycle Safety Helmets, 19 CONTEMP. ECON. POLY 397, 404
(2001)). The other figures are derived from Jahn K. Hakes & W. Kip Viscusi, Automobile
Seatbelt Usage and the Value of Statistical Life, 73 S. ECON. J. 659, 671 (2007); James
Jondrow et al., The Optimal Speed Limit, 21 ECON. INQUIRY 325 (1983); Arthur van
Benthem, What Is the Optimal Speed Limit on Freeways?, 124 J.PUB.ECON. 44 (2015); Orley
Ashenfelter & Michael Greenstone, Using Mandated Speed Limits to Measure the Value of
a Statistical Life (Natl Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9094, 2002),
http://www.nber.org/papers/w9094 [https://perma.cc/8CSL-JHL2].
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B. Explaining the Community/Market Distinction
What makes the Table 2 studies market VSLs and the Table 3
studies community VSLs? And what makes community VSLs more
appropriate for use in tort law and regulations? This Section
addresses these questions.
Social norms are powerful, informal mechanisms that incentivize
certain behaviors when formal (legal) sanctions are ineffective or
entirely absent.60 Broadly speaking, social norms can be understood
as regularities in the way people understand and react to social
situations.61 A wide definition of community norms would include
conventions (such as driving on a certain side of the road), habits
(like drinking coffee in the morning), descriptive norms (such as
taking off ones hat when it is hot), and injunctive norms (such as
not littering in public spaces).62 Injunctive social norms, which are
the most important subcategory to legal scholars, prescribe behav-
ior rather than merely describe it. They are more than accidental
or convenient behavioral patterns. Injunctive norms direct us to-
ward what we ought to do, and violating them leads many of us to
feel guilt. Further, injunctive social norms have a moral dimen-
sionan oughtnessabout them, an internal dimension that is
much discussed in jurisprudence.63 Thus, the construction of a
persons self-conception involves internalizing norms and taking
them as guides: Beyond affecting the content and intensity of
numerous particular predispositions, social norms help form (and
reform) the self, by profoundly influencing peoples identities, their
60. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903,
935-37 (1996).
61. Id. at 936.
62. See, e.g., Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Law for a ComplexEconomy, 23 SW. U. L.
REV. 443, 447 (1994) (Taking off your hat to escape the heat is different from taking off your
hat to satisfy an obligation. The former is a regularity and the latter is a norm.); Yuval
Feldman & Janice Nadler, The Law and Norms of File Sharing, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 577,
598 (2006) (Descriptive norms are how most people would behave in comparable situations.
Injunctive norms refer to the extent to which most people would approve of the target
behavior.).
63. The internal point of view is famously discussed in H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF
LAW 89-91 (3d ed. 2012). For the connection of Hart to utility theory in economics, see Robert
Cooter, The Intrinsic Value of Obeying a Law: Economic Analysis of the Internal Viewpoint,
75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1275, 1275 (2006).
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world views, their views of themselves, the projects they undertake,
and thus the people they seek to become.64
Individuals internalize social norms to varying degrees, as indica-
ted by their commitment to obeying them. Sometimes a persons
commitment is less than the cost of observing a social norm, so the
person is predisposed to violate the norm. In these circumstances,
external pressures can tip the individuals balance from violation to
conformity. Informal sanctions supply some of this pressure. For
example, individuals who choose not to vote are subject to mild
forms of harassment by their politically engaged friends. Similarly,
smoking in certain contexts is met with scorn and confrontation;65
litterbugs are chastised by passersby;66 unethical practices tarnish
valuable business reputations;67 and motorists who drive unsafely
or fail to heed traffic signals suffer horn honking and unsavory
hand gestures.68
Some social norms concern safety and precaution. They prescribe
reasonable care as it is understood in the community. Failure to
wear a seat belt, for example, invites social opprobrium.69 Choosing
not to buckle a child into an appropriate car seat,70 or not requiring
them to wear a bicycle helmet,71 also falls below social standards
and subjects noncompliers to informal social sanctions. Similarly,
observing speed limits (within a reasonable range) is another
example of a behavior subject to social scrutiny.72 Of course, many
choices about safety are not constrained by social norms. For
64. AMITAI ETZIONI, THE MONOCHROME SOCIETY 169 (2001).
65. See Robert A. Kagan & Jerome H. Skolnick, Banning Smoking: Compliance Without
Enforcement, in SMOKING POLICY: LAW, POLITICS, AND CULTURE 69, 77 (Robert L. Rabin &
Stephen D. Sugarman eds., 1993).
66. See Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021,
2030 (1996).
67. See Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating
Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH.L.REV. 1724, 1748-49 (2001).
68. See Horn Honking Etiquette, DRIVERS ED GURU: THE FREE ONLINE GUIDE TO
LEARNINGTODRIVE, http://www.driversedguru.com/driving-articles/drivers-ed-extras/horn-
etiquette/ [https://perma.cc/SYE3-YPXK] (last visited Feb. 21, 2016).
69. See Maggie Wittlin, Note, Buckling Under Pressure: An Empirical Test of the Expres-
sive Effects of Law, 28 YALE J. REG. 419, 431 (2011).
70. See Terry P. Klassen et al., Community-Based Injury Prevention Interventions, 10
FUTURE CHILD. 83, 83 (2000).
71. Id.
72. See Mark A. Elliott et al., Drivers Compliance with Speed Limits: An Application of
the Theory of Planned Behavior, 88 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 964, 966-67 (2003).
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example, social norms do not dictate that everyone should buy auto-
mobiles with the best safety features, such as Volvos or Teslas.
Further, social norms do not dictate whether to take a particularly
risky job.
Community VSLs73 use the content of social norms to infer dam-
ages for death. More specifically, community damages are gener-
ated through a variant of the famous formula used by Judge
Learned Hand in United States v. Carroll Towing.74 The original
goal of the Hand Rule was to identify a reasonable standard of care
in the absence of community norms about precautiona process
that we call Hand Rule Negligence.75 According to Judge Hand, a
reasonable person would invest in precaution until the costs of care
(B) equal the expected harms associated with the activity in ques-
tion (the likelihood of harm, P, multiplied by its magnitude, L).76
Where B equals or exceeds P x L, the standard of care is met; where
P x L exceeds B, the behavior is negligent.77 In other words,
reasonable care entails all precautions that are cost-justified from
a societal point of view.
Community damages rely on the same three variables as Hand
Rule Negligence, but rather than solving for a standard of care (B)
in cases where the magnitude of harm and its likelihood (L and P)
are known, community damages solve for L, given B and P. In alge-
braic terms, L = B/P, meaning that the community value of life is
the ratio of the marginal cost of saving a life to the marginal re-
duction in fatal risk. In essence, community damages reduce quali-
tative community standards into costs and risk-reduction numbers
to arrive at reasonable or community valuations of injuries.
For example, if social norms dictate that children should wear
bicycle helmets, then the cost and risk reduction associated with
using helmets would reveal appropriate damages for a child killed
73. Note that the concept of community VSLs could be applied to more than fatal acci-
dents; in such a case, the community damages would be generated by the cost and risk
reduction associated with norms aimed to prevent nonfatal injuries. A previous paper called
these Hand Rule Damages; we change the term to community damages to emphasize the
distinction between decisions made by reference to communal norms and those made through
an individual safety calculus.
74. 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
75. See id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
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or injured by tortious activity. If the full cost of using a bicycle hel-
met, including both the cost and disutility of wearing it, is $100 per
year, and the helmet reduces the risk of death by 1/10,000, com-
munity damages in the case of wrongful death would be $1 million.
Adopting community VSLs as a measure of tort damages would
further the goal of internal consistency in tort. Where the standard
of care is established by reference to community norms, damages
should also be linked to norms. The Hand Rule equation makes the
relationship between the (marginal) burden of precaution and the
(marginal) reduction in expected harm explicit: B = P x L. In cases
where B and P are known and L is not, the equation can be rear-
ranged to L = B/P. The rearranged equation merely says that the
risk/money tradeoffs embodied by social norms imply a value of life.
As discussed more fully in Part III.A, failure to use B/Pthe
community VSLas a measure of damages for fatal accidents leads
to misalignments78 and sends potential injurers mixed messages
about the costs and consequences of non-compliance.
1. Implementing Community VSLs
To be useful in computing community damages, reasonable be-
havior must be translated from qualitative to quantitative terms.
Specifically, the reasonable precaution level must be expressed as
a marginal cost of precaution and a corresponding marginal reduc-
tion in risk. In Judge Hands notation, we need explicit values for
B and P. The determination of B and P could be implemented in
several ways. The court could first determine liability by deciding
whether the defendants breach of the community standard caused
the plaintiff s injury. After deciding liability, the court would move
to the stage of determining the damages. Legislators or regulators
could employ experts to determine the values of B and P in com-
munity standards of care. Using these values, a schedule of
community damages could be constructed for various types of harm.
Courts could apply the schedule to award damages in trials.
Alternatively, judges and juries might find values of B and P with
the aid of experts. In the latter case, the court would hear evidence
on the marginal costs of precaution (B) and the associated marginal
78. See Porat, supra note 5, at 115-16.
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reductions in risk (P) associated with the community standards of
care. B and P could be regarded as matters of fact that the court
must determine from testimony. The court could hear expert testi-
mony from both sides of a dispute regarding a range of community
standards of care, including any specific norms applicable to the
case at hand. Once B and P are proved, the court can calculate
damages by dividing B by P as required by community damages.
Given the centrality of community standards and norms to legal
liability in the tort context, computing community damages (or
community values of life) appears to present no special problems
that courts do not already face in such cases.
Importantly, we are not suggesting that particular social norms
should necessarily be used to calculate damages for fatal accidents
on a case-by-case basis. Rather, we are suggesting that the touch-
stone for the damage analysis be injunctive social norms more
broadly. To encourage uniformity of damages, a large number of
social norms could be examined and courts could use the average
community value of life as a measure of damages. However, if
greater flexibility and individuation are desired, social norms could
be used to determine context-specific community VSLs (for exam-
ple, using speeding VSLs to determine damages from speeding;
using smoke alarm VSLs to determine damages from a fire).
Because norms inconsistently value human life in different con-
texts, the latter implementation would sacrifice uniformity in
damages by being more faithful to the implicit values of life
contained in particular social norms.
C. Social Norms as Ideal Behavior (and Guidepost for Damages)
The preceding Section made an important distinction between
individual precautionary behavior and social norm-guided behavior.
The Section also made a distinction between descriptive norms and
prescriptive (or injunctive) social norms. Here, we elaborate on
these distinctions and discuss why certain types of social norms
injunctive normsare uniquely worthy of serving as the basis for
tort damage calculations. In short, the deliberative, collective, and
iterative process by which injunctive social norms are formed (and
re-formed) makes them a desirable touchstone for damage estima-
tion. Injunctive social norms reflect collective attitudes about public
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safety that are aspirational or idealized. Contrarily, individual
market behavior often reflects self-interest and idiosyncratic prefer-
ences about risk, rather than community values. Individual market
behavior concerning risk is also more susceptible to bias and error
than injunctive social norms.
Much of the VSL literature derives values of life by looking at
wage premiums for risky jobs.79 For example, assume job A pays
$30,000 and entails a 1/100,000 risk of death, while job B pays
$30,100 and entails a 1/50,000 chance of death; the jobs are other-
wise identical. The market pays workers a wage premium of $100
to accept an additional 1/100,000 risk of death. In this case, the
implied VSL is $10 million. In other words, accepting $100 to
assume an extra 1/100,000 chance of death, or foregoing the same
amount to avoid it, implies a VSL of $10 million.80 However, such
job choices are mostly matters of individual preferences and econ-
omic constraints, rather than community norms. Because ones
choice of a jobat least in terms of its riskinessis not typically
governed by social norms, the VSL implied by wage premium
studies is a market value rather than a community value.81 We
discuss the regulatory use of labor market studies, and their var-
ious shortcomings, in Part III.
The social norms considered in this Article, and the only type on
which community VSLs should plausibly be based, are injunctive
social norms. As mentioned in Part II.B, injunctive social norms
prescribe actions that communities consider to be ideal, and they
are behaviors that communities are willing to enforce through
costly social sanctions. Such norms generally concern what people
ought to do, not what they actually or regularly do. Social norms, in
short, concern approved or disapproved behavior rather than
average behavior. The objective signs of social approval and dis-
approval are, among others, praise, blame, inclusion, exclusion,
partiality, esteem, and contempt.
As collective commitments, injunctive norms must be continual-
ly explained and justified in communal discourse. By shifting the
79. See, e.g., Viscusi & Aldy, supra note 9, at 7.
80. Of course, the actual econometric methodologies used to derive VSL estimates are far
more complex; the simplified example provided is for illustrative purposes only.
81. We address the regulatory application of labor market studiesand propose an
alternativein Part III.B.
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terms of the discussion from individual strategy to public welfare
and morality, social norms protect communities against the folly of
irresponsible people (or responsible people who lapse into irrespon-
sibility). They also protect communities from rules that benefit one
community subgroup at the expense of others:
Social norms evolve through a process of discussion, which often
exposes evolutionary traps. Evolutionary traps often occur be-
cause the best strategy for each individual benefits him less
than it harms other players.... [A] community will not develop
social norms supporting strategies that harm its members. Once
exposed, a strategy leading to an evolutionary trap may be
censured by a community, or tolerated, but not encouraged. In
other words, a consensus will not arise in the community that its
member ought to follow a strategy leading to an evolutionary
trap.82
The collective nature of norms has other benefits as well. Because
norms require some level of collective agreement, individual errors
in reasoning will often impact the resulting rule less than individ-
ual decision making.83 Even if the community is not especially
intelligent or technically sophisticated, the mere fact that they are
a group can make their collective wisdom more dependable. This
information dynamic resembles the price-setting abilities of a
market: partial information from many people results in a better
rule than any individual could make, just as efficient markets
combine the costs and benefits of many individuals into a better
price than any individual could set. Reinforcing this processand
also the market metaphoris the fact that norms constantly
compete with each other for peoples allegiance. When a superior
alternative presents itself, the community can revise or abandon
existing norms.84
82. See Robert D. Cooter, Structural Adjudication and the New Law Merchant: A Model
of Decentralized Law, 14 INTL REV. L. & ECON. 215, 224-25 (1994).
83. See, e.g., David Austen-Smith & Jeffrey S. Banks, Information Aggregation, Ration-
ality, and the Condorcet Jury Theorem, 90 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 34, 34 (1996) (discussing the
Condorcet Jury Theorem). But see THOMAS SPENCE SMITH, STRONG INTERACTION 121-22
(1992) (discussing the polarization of crowds).
84. See ERIC A.POSNER, LAWANDSOCIALNORMS 44-46 (2000); Robert D. Cooter, Punitive
Damages, Social Norms, and Economic Analysis, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 73, 82 (1997);
Robert C. Ellickson, The Market for Social Norms, 3 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1, 22-29 (2001).
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Much of our argument relies on the notion that injunctive social
norms as collective agreements about ideal behaviorare mean-
ingful measures of the values that communities implicitly place on
life and limb. Although we believe that social norms of precaution
often reflect considered judgments about safety, social norms are
not perfect: they may be outdated, based on incorrect information,
or tainted by self-interested community subgroups. Fortunately,
norms canand doimprove: most notably through the competitive
process noted above. Interestingly, the use of community VSLs in
tort may also aid in the refinement of norms. Relying on norms in
court can serve to change them by exposing the public to the
implicit values of life contained in the norms. Most people do not
know the implicit values of life and limb associated with their
behavior, or with social norms. Using norms as a basis for damages
would publicize these implicit values, or revealed collective prefer-
ences about safety. If damages seem too high, communities may
decide that more risk is acceptable, either generally or in specific
contexts. This adjustment process may also make social norms of
precaution more consistent in the way that they value life and limb.
To illustrate the distinction between injunctive norms and
descriptive behavioral norms, consider the case of driving speeds.
Most people drive over the speed limit on some occasions, and many
may flagrantly violate the limit on rare occasions. In a sense, then,
driving the speed limit is not the average behavior; the average
would include the flagrant speeding. Communities, however, would
not likely enforce a norm that allowed flagrant speeding. Though in-
dividuals may sometimes free ride on the speeding normcap-
turing the benefits of others reduced speeds and avoiding the costs
of driving slowly themselvesnorm-violators individual actions
cannot change an injunctive norm.
Because nontrivial or flagrant violations of speed limits invite
social scorn, roughly obey the speed limit counts as an injunctive
community norm. The health/wealth tradeoffs reflected in this
norm therefore generate community VSLs. Three of the studies rep-
resented in Table 3 thus rely on VSLs derived from speed limits.85
85. Driving speed studies reflect the ratio of cost to reduced death risk, where the cost
is the extra time spent on the road due to reduced speed. For example, Ashenfelter and
Greenstone exploit a change in speed limits in various states to estimate an implied value
of life. See Ashenfelter & Greenstone, supra note 59, at 1. In 1987, many states chose to
2016] COMMUNITY VERSUS MARKET VALUES OF LIFE 745
Another three of the community VSL studies in Table 3 rely on
social norms governing seat belt use.86 The seat belt studies yield
increase the speed limit on rural interstate roads from 55 mph to 65 mph. Id. Individuals
were free to drive faster than they were previously, and their change in average driving
speeds indicates the way they trade off health and wealth. In this study, as well as the other
driving speed studies, the cost of driving faster is the increase in the chance of fatality. Id.
at 4. Examination of data from the Fatal Accident Reporting System, which collects data on
all fatal car crashes in the United States, allowed Ashenfelter and Greenstone to estimate
the chance of fatality. Id. at 11. The benefit of driving faster is the decreased driving time,
which is valued at the average wage rate. Id. at 4. The authors obtained data on actual
driving speeds from various departments of transportation and estimated average total miles
driven from Federal Highway Administration data. Id. at 10-11. From this, the authors
derived an upper bound community VSL of $1.7 million. See supra Table 3.
Van Benthems analysis is similar to Ashenfelter and Greenstones study but analyzes
changes in speed limits from two points of view: that of a social planner and that of an
individual. See van Benthem, supra note 59, at 66. Like Ashenfelter and Greenstones
analysis, the study revolves around the tradeoff between health and wealth, and the way this
tradeoff manifests itself in driving speed decisions. See id. However, van Benthems analysis
also accounts for nonfatal accidents, fuel costs, and the climate effects of driving speed. Id.
at 65. Van Benthems study yields a number of VSL figures ranging from $870,000 to $6.02
million. Id. at 59. However, for our purposes, the most plausible range from the study is
$870,000-$3.16 million. Id. The $870,000 estimate accounts for fatal and nonfatal accidents,
fuel costs, climate damage associated with driving speed, and respiratory health of adults
and infants. Id. at 59-60. The $3.7 million estimate accounts only for fatal and nonfatal
accidents. Id. The latter estimate is higher than the former because the implied tradeoff is
spread across fewer variables; if one drives slowly only to avoid the risk of collision, the
implied value of life will be higher than if one drives slowly for additional reasons, such as
climate damage.
The appropriate estimate for our purposes is the one that most closely captures the
motivation behind the social norm for driving at (or near) the speed limit. If the social norm
for driving speeds is based on only the communitys concern over fatal and nonfatal
accidents, the best estimate from van Benthem is $3.16 million. If the social norm is based
on other concerns, such as respiratory health or climate damage due to speeding, the most
appropriate estimate is $735,000. Either seems plausible.
Jondrow et al.s study estimates the private and social optima for speed limits by observing
how fast individuals drive without speed limits. See Jondrow et al., supra note 59, at 325.
The optimum speed limit is derived by setting the private benefits of speeding to the social
costs. Id. The estimate presented in Table 3 is based on Ted Millers adjustments to
Jondrows analysis. See Ted R. Miller, The Plausible Range for the Value of Life Red
Herrings Among the Mackerel, 3 J.FORENSICECON. 17, 29 (1990). Miller adjusts the numbers
to account for fatal and nonfatal injuries, and also updates a number of variables (such as
average speed, fuel cost, and injury statistics) to arrive at a VSL range of $1.12-$1.84 million.
Id.
86. Three of the ten studies included in Table 3 derive the value of life implied by the use
of seat belts. The analyses in this category share a similar structure to the speed limit
studies: the values of life are essentially the ratio of the cost of using seat belts, divided by
the reduction in risk associated with their use. In algebraic terms:
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community values of life because the use of seat belts is governed
by social norms. Though seat belt use has not always been preva-
lent,87 most people now bristle at the sight of a beltless driver, and
many would be moved to say something to pressure the person to
buckle upespecially in the case of children. Further, there are
numerous awareness campaigns about the dangers of driving with-
out seat belts, some of which portray seat belt use as normal or
cool, and others which suggest that failure to use a seat belt is
stupid.88 The essence of social norms is the willingness of commu-
nity members to exert (costly) informal pressure on potential viola-
tors. The fact that people who have no financial interest in the use
or sale of seat belts will expend effort to enforce their use implies
the presence of an injunctive social norm. For similar reasons, the
other studies represented in Table 3which infer VSLs from the
cost and risk reduction associated with the use of bicycle helmets,
child car seats, and smoke alarms89count as community VSLs.90
Implied Value of Life = (Total Cost of Seat Belt Use)(Reduction in Risk of Death)
For the seat belt studies, the cost side of the equation comprises the discomfort of using a
seatbelt and the time it takes to buckle uptime that could otherwise be spent earning
money. Using information on the average number of car trips taken over a year, average
wages, and the effectiveness of seat belts (in terms of reducing death), the authors of each
study are able to determine the implied value of life associated with seat belt use.
87. See TIMOTHY M. PICKRELL & EUN-HA CHOI, NATL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN.
[NHTSA], U.S. DEPT OF TRANSP., RES. NOTE NO. DOT HS 812 113, SEAT BELT USE IN
2014OVERALLRESULTS 1, http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/Pubs/812113.pdf [https://perma.cc/
YR88-FR4C].
88. See, e.g., JENNIFER WALKER ET AL., NHTSA, REPORT NO. DOT HS 811 894, CREATING
A CAMPAIGN FOR PARENTS OF PRE-DRIVERS TO ENCOURAGE SEAT BELT USE BY 13- TO 15-YEAR
OLDS 33 (2014), http://www.nhtsa.gov/staticfiles/nti/pdf/811894-Campaign_for_Parents_of_
Pre-Drivers_to_Encourage_Seat_Belt_Use.pdf [https://perma.cc/2XVS-6RFF]; Sleepy Not
Stupid, TRAFFICSAFETY MARKETING, http://www.trafficsafetymarketing.gov/CAMPAIGNS/
Seat+Belts/Buckle+Up+America/Thanksgiving+Weekend/Sleepy+Not+Stupid [https://perma.
cc/H2Y3-TAW3]. See generally Seat Belts Save Lives, TRAFFIC SAFETY MARKETING, http://
www.trafficsafetymarketing.gov/BUA [https://perma.cc/AD75-F5C9].
89. The remaining studies in Table 3 cover various safety-related consumption activities
that are bound up with social norms. Jenkins et al.s study estimates the implied value of life
from the purchase and use of bicycle helmets for adults and children. See Robin R. Jenkins
et al., Valuing Reduced Risk to Children: The Case of Bicycle Safety Helmets, 19 CONTEMP.
ECON. POLY 397, 397 (2001). The value of life implied by the purchase and use of bicycle
helmets is the ratio of the annualized cost of the helmet to the risk reduction it provides to
users. Id. at 399-400. To estimate the costs and the useful life of a bicycle helmet, the authors
use data from Consumer Reports magazine. Id. at 401. To estimate the risk reduction
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As the above examples demonstrate, community norms and legal
rules often govern the same activities. When these norms and rules
overlap, individuals are doubly pressured to conform. In the case of
seat belts, for example, drivers face an expected fine when they
choose not to buckle up, and they also face the possibility of social
sanctions and guilt. Double enforcement raises the compliance rate,
especially in cases of imperfect legal enforcement.91 It is worthwhile
to note that, in such cases, the existence of the law does not under-
mine the value of the related social norm as a guide to the value of
life. Though legal rules arise from legislative bargains rather than
communal deliberation, communities make the choice in certain
cases to adopt a law and engage in costly enforcement measures
to ensure compliance. That communities are willing to enforce
certain legal rules, and not others, suggests that social norms em-
body some approval of the underlying risk/health tradeoffs in the
laws.92 In short, social norms that piggyback on, or overlap
associated with helmet use, the authors use a combination of census data, telephone surveys
on bicycle and helmet use, and data on bicycle deaths from the U.S. Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention. Id. at 402. Since bicycle helmets prevent both injury and death, the
authors present two estimates: one assuming that the full cost of the bicycle helmet is aimed
at preventing death, and another (more realistic) estimate attributing half of the helmet cost
to injury risk reduction and the other half to death risk reduction. Id. at 405.
The key feature of the Jenkins et al. study is that it captures the risk/money tradeoff
inherent in a social norm: the social norm that encourages bicycle riders to use helmets. This
encouragement comes in the form of social sanctions for violators of the norm, and costly
efforts to raise awareness and promote the use of bicycle helmets. As mentioned above, the
fact that social norms are a collective, community judgment about safety and the value of life
means that the valuation of life inherent in the norm is a community value of life.
Carlin and Sandys article is similar in structure to Jenkins et al.s article. See Paul S.
Carlin & Robert Sandy, Estimating the Implicit Value of a Young Childs Life, 58 S. ECON.
J. 186, 186 (1991). Carlin and Sandy derive the implied value of a childs life from the pur-
chase and use of child car safety seats by their parents. Id. The data sources for the study
come from The Program for Childrens Automobile Safety at Riley Childrens Hospital, which
collected data on car seat usage in the state of Indiana. Id. at 188. Follow-up surveys were
also performed to gather specific details on car seat usage. Id. Data on the reduction in
fatality risk associated with child car safety seats were obtained from previous scholarly
studies. Id. at 195-96. Average wage rates in the state of Indiana in 1985 were used as the
value of time. Id. at 196. Using these data, the authors estimate the value of a childs life to
be $800,000 in year-2000 dollars. Because a parent must use child safety seats for children
to conform with social expectations, the tradeoff between risk and money in this context is
a community value of the life of a child.
90. See Carlin & Sandy, supra note 89, at 188.
91. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 66, at 2032-33.
92. For example, jaywalkers and those who fail to completely stop at stop signs are
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substantively with, legal rules appear to be more than generic
inducements to follow the law, regardless of its content.
1. Community Norms, Social Welfare, and Norm-Efficiency
The preceding Section discussed reasons why prescriptive com-
munity norms might plausibly increase social welfare: the collective
wisdom of groups, the deliberative aspect of norm creation, the
competition from alternative norms, and the educational aspect in-
herent in the use of community VSLs.93 A related, and much
debated, question is whether social norms are efficient. More specif-
ically: do social norms encourage economically efficient behavior,
and does the answer to the efficiency question determine their
appropriateness as a guidepost for damage awards?
From a strict economic perspective, the latter question is uni-
formly answered in the affirmative: social norms are desirable rules
of social conduct only insofar as they are efficient, or at least tend
towards efficiency vis-à-vis some relevant alternative (usually
formal, legal rules). Accordingly, the question of norm efficiency has
generated a rich and varied literature that can be broken into two
broad camps: the norm optimists and norm pessimists. The
optimistic view holds that social norms often evolve towards ef-
ficiency for many of the reasons supplied above: the collective
wisdom of groups, the deliberative aspect of norm creation, and
competition from alternative norms.94 The pessimists, on the other
hand, claim that informational problems, externalities, and en-
forcement problems associated with social norms will often trans-
late into inefficiency.95 Some pessimists contend that even when
social norms do move toward efficiency over time, the pace of social
arguably subject to less social sanctioning than flagrant speeders and those who fail to wear
seat belts.
93. See, e.g., Cooter, supra note 84, at 82.
94. See, e.g., id.
95. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV.
1697, 1711-25 (1996) (detailing the causes of inefficient norms in society).
2016] COMMUNITY VERSUS MARKET VALUES OF LIFE 749
change is glacial.96 The answer to the first of the two questions
presented above, then, is mixed.
A full account of the question of norm efficiency is beyond the
scope of this Article and, in any event, largely beside the point of
our claims. First, and most importantly, we are not concerned with
norm efficiency per se. Our proposed use of social norms is to define
the value of certain outcomes rather than to inquire whether a
given norm would lead to efficiency given some range of outcomes
whose value is already known. It makes little sense to inquire,
simultaneously, whether a given norm of precaution maximizes
utilityor satisfies some other efficiency criterionwhile using the
content of the norm at issue to infer the value of life and limb. This
is particularly the case when, as in tort, social norms are often used
to determine the standard of care, irrespective of their efficiency.97
On pain of circularity, therefore, we cannot engage in the debate
over the efficiency of norms.98
Put another way, damage awards are logically prior to judgments
of efficiency in tort law, just as consumer valuations are logically
prior to efficiency in markets. The demand curve ideally depicts
how much people are willing to pay for a good.99 The supply curve
ideally depicts the cost of producing a good.100 The intersection be-
tween the supply curve and the demand curve achieves efficiency
in markets.101 Similarly, the damage awards ideally determine the
harm of accidents to their victims,102 and the standard of care
determines the legal burden of care on injurers.103 The equality be-
tween damage awards and the standard of care achieves efficiency
96. See, e.g., Steven Hetcher, Creating Safe Social Norms in a Dangerous World, 73 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1, 70 (1999); Paul G. Mahoney & Chris W. Sanchirico, Competing Norms and
Social Evolution: Is the Fittest Norm Efficient?, 149 U.PA.L.REV. 2027, 2058 (2001); Posner,
supra note 95, at 1738-39.
97. See, e.g., Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social Norms, 99 COLUM. L. REV.
1253, 1271 (1999).
98. In Part III, we do argue that community VSLs give efficient incentives given that
social norms define reasonable care.
99. See JAMES GWARTNEY ET AL., MACROECONOMICS: PRIVATE AND PUBLIC CHOICE 45
(15th ed. 2014).
100. Id. at 60.
101. Id.
102. See MARTIN L. NEWELL, A TREATISE OF THE LAW OF MALICIOUS PROSECUTION, FALSE
IMPRISONMENT, AND THE ABUSE OF LEGAL PROCESS 491 (1892).
103. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 4 (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
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in tort law.104 Thus, community damages come first and critiques of
tort law based on efficiency come second.
Instead of looking at efficiency, we consider whether the process
of norm creation carries certain indicia of reliability. More specifi-
cally, we ask whether injunctive social norms are, as a general
matter, more reliable than the relevant legal alternative to damage
estimation. In torts, the alternative method of estimating damages
for death is the unaided intuition of jurors.105 For reasons discussed
earlier, asking juries to provide reasonable compensation is inco-
herent at best, and offensive at worst.106 The wide variability of
damages for similar injuries is evidence that such instructions are
profoundly flawed. Our modest claim is that, in light of the col-
lective, deliberative, and iterative process by which social norms are
created, the implicit values of life contained in such community
judgments are superior to jury guesses about the value of a life.107
Even if the conclusions of the norm pessimists can be recast as
statements about the general reliability of social norms,108 rather
than about the efficiency of norms per se, the pessimists arguments
often proceed from a conception of norms that we reject. Specifi-
cally, for legal purposes, we reject defining a social norm as a
behavioral regularity rather than a community ideal. A close
examination of the literature on norm efficiency reveals that the
norm pessimists often use a definition of norms that more closely
resembles behavioral regularity109 than community ideal. As
useful as the norm pessimists analyses are in explaining how
collective behavioral patterns emerge in various contexts, they are
often irrelevant to our central claims.
104. See Jennifer H. Arlen, Note, An Economic Analysis of Tort Damages for Wrongful
Death, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1113, 1116 (1985).
105. See Paul H. Robinson, Are Criminal Codes Irrelevant?, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 159, 170
(1994).
106. See supra Part I.B.
107. In Part III we discuss the (relative) desirability of social norms vis-à-vis the
regulatory alternative: individual market VSLs.
108. For a brief explanation of norm pessimist and norm optimist ideology, see Robert C.
Ellickson, The Evolution of Social Norms: A Perspective from the Legal Academy, in SOCIAL
NORMS 35, 54, 57-58 (Michael Hechter & Karl-Dieter Opp eds., 2001).
109. See Edward Rock & Michael Wachter, Meeting by Signals, Playing by Norms:
Complementary Accounts of Nonlegal Cooperation in Institutions, 36 U. RICH. L. REV. 423,
429-30 (2002).
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Stephen Hetchers analysis of social norms and the use of custom
in tort law is illustrative.110 Among other things, Hetcher claims
that courts do not (and should not) rely on custom as a matter of
course in light of efficiency concerns.111 However, many of Hetchers
examples reveal that, by social norm, he often refers to judicial
notions of custom or average conduct.112
When conformity is used defensively, the injurer in effect asks:
How could I have done wrong, as I was simply doing what others
do in similar situations? How could all the conformers to this
widespread social custom be negligent?113 According to Hetchers
reading of a judicial per se rule, ordinary usage amounts to a
basically statistical notion, the average. Average people are by
definition doing what most others are doing; that is, conforming to
widespread customs.114 With respect to speeding, Hetcher observes:
In the example of speeding in automobiles ... failure to solve the
collective action problem leads to a dangerous situation be-
causeas public service ads are fond of sayingspeed kills. The
world we live in is one in which this collective action problem
goes largely unsolved; people speed with frequency and others
are injured or die because of it.115
In our view, social norms often attempt to solve a collective action
problem.116 Thus, the social norm of safe driving distinguishes
between reckless and safe drivers, rather than averaging them. If
one car goes 25 mph and another car goes 55 mph on the same
residential street, the community approves of the former and dis-
approves of the latter. Honking horns, rude gestures, anger, gossip,
and so forth indicate disapproval. In this two-car example, the
average behavior of 40 mph is an accurate statistic about driving,
but it is not accurate about the communitys approval and disap-
proval that indicates the existence of an injunctive norm. As stated
110. See Hetcher, supra note 96.
111. See id. at 67.
112. Id. at 11.
113. Id. at 5.
114. Id. at 11.
115. Id. at 40.
116. See Cass Sunstein, supra note 60, at 918 ([S]ocial norms solve collective action
problems by encouraging people to do useful things.).
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above, community VSLs concern injunctive social normsideal
behaviors and attitudes rather than averages or patterns.
Paul Mahoney and Chris Sanchiricos game-theoretic analysis of
norm efficiency is similar to Hetchers insofar as it appears to
characterize norms as behavioral patterns that emerge from indiv-
idual rationality rather than deliberative, communal commitments
that respond to and correct for irrationality.117 Accordingly, their
analysis of precaution in tortas represented in a Stag Hunt
economic game118amounts to a statement that people will not take
efficient levels of precaution because it is costly.119 The game-
theoretic solution presented in the speeding car example, though,
does not appear to take into account the informal costs that might
be imposed on drivers through social sanctions, nor does the
example acknowledge that norms are more than behavioral
patterns. In this sense, the game-theoretic models used in Mahoney
and Sanchiricos article describe the problems that social norms are
meant to solve rather than describing how norms might, in fact,
solve those problems.
Another analysis by Eric Posner applies a broader definition of
norms than the above authors120 but reaches a similar conclusion:
[U]nder a variety of plausible conditions ... norms are likely to be
inefficient, in the sense of failing to enable group members to
exploit the full surplus of collective action.121 The cited reasons for
norm inefficiency include informational problems,122 intergroup
externalities,123 and strategic behavior by norm producers and en-
117. See Mahoney & Sanchirico, supra note 96, at 2030. Though they appreciate that
norms are more than behavioral regularitiesrules of conduct that constrain self-interested
behavior and that are adopted and enforced in an informal, decentralized settingthey
model norms as the product of individual strategy. Id.
118. Id. at 2041 (providing an explanation of the Stag Hunt economic game).
119. See id. at 2054 ([T]he efficient action entails an expenditure or opportunity cost
while the inefficient action does not.).
120. See Posner, supra note 95, at 1699. Importantly, Posner avoids defining norms as
behavioral patterns that emerge from individual rationality: A norm can be understood as
a rule that distinguishes desirable and undesirable behavior and gives a third party the
authority to punish a person who engages in the undesirable behavior. Thus, a norm con-
strains attempts by people to satisfy their preferences. Id.
121. Id. at 1698.
122. Id. at 1711-13.
123. Id. at 1722-23.
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forcers.124 Although many of these problems could conceivably
plague the evolution and enforcement of social norms in certain con-
texts, the problems Posner observed are not fatal to our argument.
First, Posners notion of efficiency is relative; his task is to com-
pare social norms and legal rules on efficiency terms.125 Again, the
purpose of Posners article differs fundamentally from the goal of
our project, which is to compare collective judgments about safety
to individual judgments (or jury guesses) about the value of life.
Secondly, most of the norms that form the basis for community
VSLs are coterminous withindeed, explicitly dependent onthe
content of legal rules.126 For example, the norm encouraging the use
of seat belts is backed by a legal sanction, as is the norm command-
ing drivers to, at least roughly, follow speed limits.127 The same can
be said of the norms that dictate the use of child car seats, smoke
alarms, and bicycle helmets.128 Accordingly, Posners concern that
legal rules are more responsive to changes in culture and technol-
ogy129 than to social norms loses much of its force in the context of
this argument. In these cases, norms piggyback directly on sub-
stantive legal rules.130 What makes them social norms, though, and
what makes them a reliable guide to damages, is the fact that
people are willing to engage in costly enforcement of these particu-
lar legal rules.131 Moreover, as discussed earlier, social norms may
124. Id. at 1713-19.
125. See id. at 1698.
126. See Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96
MICH. L. REV. 338, 347 (1997).
127. Table 3 also includes norms that encourage the use of bicycle helmets.
128. See, e.g., State-By-State Residential Smoke Alarm Requirements, U.S. FIRE ADMIN.,
FEMA, http://www.ajfire.org/uploads/smoke_alarm_requirements.pdf [https://perma.cc/NP
H9-EPCF] (detailing a fifty-state survey of laws regarding residential fire alarm require-
ments); Child Passenger Safety Laws, GOVERNORS HIGHWAY SAFETY ASSOCIATION [GHSA]
(Jan. 2016), http://www.ghsa.org/html/stateinfo/laws/childsafety_laws.html [https://perma.cc/
VLZ9-XEV4] (detailing a fifty-state survey of laws regarding child passenger restraints);
Helmet Laws, GHSA (Jan. 2016), http://www.ghsa.org/html/stateinfo/laws/helmet_laws.html
[https://perma.cc/EZB6-593X] (detailing a fifty-state survey of laws regarding helmet use).
129. See Posner, supra note 95, at 1713 (Information lag is a simple reason why judges
and legislators may produce better rules than groups. No doubt it takes time for information
to reach legislators and judges, just as it takes time for information to reach members of a
group. Nonetheless, legislators and judges are specialists at obtaining and processing
information; further, they have the means and the motive to establish institutions that
obtain and process information.).
130. See Sunstein, supra note 60, at 915-17, 923, 958-59.
131. Of course, not all injunctive social norms bear this type of relationship with legal
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evolve more rapidly when the implicit values of life embodied in
them are publicized via damage awards.
Posner also observes that social norms can be inefficient when
they support activities that injure third parties.132 Here, Posner
has in mind norms that arise in smaller, more insular communities
and redound to the benefit of that group while imposing negative
externalities on the larger community.133 An example of thisthe
only example in Posners article that specifically addresses tort
lawrevolves around medical industry norms:
A useful example comes from the problem of assigning liability
to medical practitioners after an operation that tortiously in-
jures the patient. As is well known, powerful norms dictate that
none of those present at the operation disclose the identity of the
tortfeasor. The norms benefit all members of the group, even the
innocent members, as long as there is a chance that anyone
could commit a tort in any given operation.134
As this type of problem makes clear, an important condition for
efficiency is symmetry among people with respect to benefits and
costs. With symmetry, the same people expect to absorb the benefits
and the costs of an activity, whereas with asymmetry, the people
who expect to receive the benefits are different from the people who
expect to incur the costs. When discussing a norm regarding speed-
ing, for example, people can easily imagine being in the position of
someone who wants to speed or being in the position of someone
endangered by a speeder. Each of us who drives bears the collective
risks of speeding. A similar argument can be made for many of the
social norms reflected in Table 3.
We agree with Posner, and others, who argue that courts should
review asymmetrical norms skeptically. We should, for example, be
critical of the norms of manufacturers of swimming pools because
manufacturers sell many and buy few for themselves. With asym-
metry, a community normif it can be properly called thatshould
be viewed critically. Inclusive norms merit more deference than
rules. When social norms do not rely on the content of legal rules, though, community judg-
ments about precaution are still more reliable than jury guesses.
132. Posner, supra note 95, at 1722.
133. See id. at 1722-23.
134. Id. at 1732.
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partial norms. Ordinary morality can justify this deference princi-
ple on its own, and an efficiency analysis can buttress the moral
arguments. Thus, courts should defer to inclusive community stan-
dards when they exist, but courts should apply Hand Rule Negli-
gence to decide whether to enforce partial community standards.
III. THE ECONOMIC CASE FOR USING COMMUNITY VSLS AS
DAMAGES
According to the above analysis, using social norms to calculate
damage awards leads to more meaningful valuations of life than
available alternatives, including jury guesses about the value of a
life. This Part addresses other reasons to adopt community VSLs in
tort: internal consistency and optimal deterrence. Damage awards
optimally deter when they force potential injurers to internalize all
of the expected social costs caused by their risky activities.135 Using
community VSLs to determine damage awards would create effi-
cient incentives for potential injurers because community standards
for liability are linked to community valuations of the underlying
harms. Note that by efficiency we refer not to the content of the
social norms themselves, but to the incentives associated with using
community VSLs in a legal context that already channels commu-
nity standards in the determination of reasonable care.
For example, suppose a social norm requires individuals to install
smoke alarms in their houses. If the total cost of the smoke alarms
is $50 and their use reduces the risk of fatalities by 1/40,000, the
community value of lifeand the appropriate amount of dam-
ageswould be $2 million. If courts adopted community VSLs as
damages for wrongful death, homeowners would face the following
choice: either install the smoke alarm for $50, or face an expected
liability of $2 million divided by 40,000, which equals $50.136 Thus,
using community VSLs as damages for wrongful death leads poten-
tial injurers to internalize the accident risk from violating a com-
munity standard of safety.137 The potential injurers can internalize
135. See 1 TORT LAW AND ECONOMICS § 9.3 (Michael Faure ed., 2009).
136. Because the costs of litigation and risk aversion are not included in this example,
rational homeowners will choose to install smoke alarms.
137. The injurers expected gain from violating the community standard equals the actual
gain ($50) multiplied by the reciprocal of the probability of liability ($40,000/1). Cooter and
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the risk in two ways: follow the applicable norm of precaution or
pay damages calculated from the norm.
Note that social norms can be used to calculate community dama-
ges even when the injurer is not strictly required to follow them.
For example, a norm (or set of norms) might pertain to the victims,
rather than the injurers, behavior; the tradeoff embodied within
the norm nonetheless implies the value that the community places
on the victims life. To illustrate, consider the social norm requiring
the use of bicycle helmets. Using the same risk and cost numbers
from the above smoke alarm example, we arrive, again, at a
community VSL of $2 million. In this case, though, the social norm
requiring helmet use does not apply directly to potential injurers
(many of whom are presumably car drivers). Here, it makes no
sense to require the injurer to wear a helmet. The helmet norm and
associated community VSL nonetheless signal the community value
of life by specifying the amount of precaution the injurer ought to
take. In light of the social normor the universe of precautionary
social norms in a communitydrivers and other potential injurers
of bicyclists need to take precaution that reflects the $2 million
valuation of life. If the tradeoff embodied in reduced speeds or the
purchase of antilock brakes, for example, is given a value of life
equal to $2 million, such precaution would be appropriate.138 The
point here is that community damages do not always lead injurers
to follow existing norms; however, community damages do incen-
tivize injurers to follow courses of action that value human life in
ways that are consistent with social norms of precaution.
Porat call damage awards equal to the expected gain from omitted care the disgorgement
damages for accidents, which they advocate making available as a remedy in specified types
of tort cases. See Robert Cooter & Ariel Porat, Disgorgement Damages for Accidents, 44 J.
LEGAL STUD. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript 3-4), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2439986
[https://perma.cc/56QH-RCEA].
138. Strictly speaking, community VSLs could still apply when there is no established
norm of behavior for the injurer or the victim. In such cases, courts would look at
precautionary social norms generally to see what the norms imply, on average, about the
value of life. The goal, in other words, is not to set context-dependent community values of
life; rather, it is to look at the range of social norms, see what they collectively imply about
the value of life, and apply it to courts. Approaching community damages this wayas a way
to reduce the universe of norms into a sort of average community VSLwould have two
important effects: it would make damages more uniform, and it would also push social norms
that are far away from the mean (in terms of their implied VSL) closer to the average, thus
making precautionary norms more uniform.
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A corollary of the above analysis is that failure to use community
VSLs for damage awards misaligns the community standard of care
and the level of damages.139 When courts use community standards
to establish liability, as they often do,140 failure to back up such
liability with community VSL awards sends mixed signals to
potential injurers. It tells potential injurers that the communitys
standard of care is higher than that justified by the damages im-
posed for harm caused by omitted care. Equivalently, liability for
accidents is lower than the communitys valuation of the harm
caused by omitted care.
A high standard coupled with low liability leads to underdeter-
rence.141 Expected damages are cheaper than norm-compliance, so
rational injurers would choose to violate the norm. This is especially
true if injurers can buy liability insurance with premiums only
slightly higher than their expected claims. For example, if social
norms suggest that people should drive the speed limit (or approxi-
mately the speed limit), and doing so implies a value of life at $2
million, failure to back up this precautionary standard with $2
million damages would not encourage compliance with the commu-
nity norm. Specifically, failure to use community VSLs for damages
makes liability insurance too cheap. Drivers in this case would be
too willing to take risks of accidents, and insurance companies
would be too willing to insure them.
Besides being inefficient, misalignments also imply a lack of pro-
portionality between the standard of care and the sanction for its
violation.142 Stringent standards backed by mild liability, or lax
standards backed by harsh liability, will seem unfair to many
people.143 In contrast, standards aligned with liability will seem
fair, which increases the willingness of people to obey the law.144
The use of community VSLs as damages encourages individuals to
obey the law from perceived fairness, not just from self-interest.
139. See Cooter & Porat, supra note 137 (manuscript at 15-17).
140. See, e.g., Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 104-05 (1974); Miller v. California,
413 U.S. 15, 24, 30 (1973).
141. See Porat, supra note 5, at 135-36.
142. See id. at 84.
143. See TYLER, supra note 6, at 6.
144. See id.
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Table 4 illustrates how damages are currently misaligned with
standards of precaution. Included in the table are the results of
three recent studies of wrongful death awards. For purposes of
comparison to community and market VSLs, Table 4 also includes
information on maximum wrongful death awards in four states, as
established by damage caps. Based on the three studies included in
the table, the median wrongful death award is under $1 million.
Further, the damage caps for wrongful death are in the range of
$250,000-$1 million.
Recall that community VSLsthose that reflect existing social
norms of precautioncenter around $2-3 million. The damage
awards reflected in this table are much smaller. The Table 4 values
therefore suggest that existing norms of precaution are wildly
conservative. Put another way, if wrongful death awards of $1 mil-
lionand sometimes far lessaccurately gauged community
attitudes towards risk, then flagrant speeding, no seat belt use, and
other risky behaviors would be tolerated and even encouraged. We
contend that social norms of precaution, although not always per-
fect, are far better reflections of reasonable precaution and risk
tolerance than the damage awards and caps reflected in Table 4.
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Table 4. Wrongful Death Awards, Damage Caps, and
Corresponding Speed Norms145
Author/State Data Source
Mean Award
(Millions, U.S.
Dollars)
Median
Award (Mil-
lions, U.S.
Dollars)
Comments
Posner & Sunstein JVS 3.1 1.1
Cases range in
date from 1999-
2003
Posner & Sunstein CJS 3.8 0.961 2001 dollars
Vidmar et al.
(NY) -
2.2 (award)
1.7 (actual
recovery)
1.1 (award)
0.6 (actual
recovery)
1995 dollars
Vidmar et al.
(Fla.) -
1.2 (award)
1.14 (actual
recovery)
0.774 (award)
0.731 (actual
recovery)
1995 dollars
Vidmar et al. (Cal.) -
0.68 (award)
0.584 (actual
recovery)
0.391 (award)
0.332 (actual
recovery)
1995 dollars
Cross & Silver - 0.413 0.2
Settlement values
as reported from
insurance data-
base; 1988 dollars
Wisconsin § 895.04 (4)
Damage Cap:
0.35 (adult)
0.5 (minor)
- -
Alaska § 09.17.010 Damage Cap: 0.4 -
Limits
noneconomic
damages
Colorado § 13-21-203(1)(a)
Damage Cap:
0.25 -
Limits
noneconomic
damages
Kansas § 60-1903(a) Damage Cap:0.25 -
Limits
noneconomic
damages
145. See ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 09.17.010 (West 2015); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-
203(1)(a) (West 2015); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1903(a) (West 2015); WIS. STAT. § 895.04(4)
(2015); Frank Cross & Charles Silver, In Texas, Life Is Cheap, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1875, 1901
(2006); Posner & Sunstein, supra note 51, at 548; Vidmar et al., supra note 13, at 284, 287,
291, 293-95.
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A. Theoretical Challenges to the Use of VSL Estimates as
Damages
The use of VSL figures to determine damage awards has been
proposed by Eric Posner and Cass Sunstein, but remains more
controversial than the regulatory use of VSLs.146 Some of the argu-
ments against using VSL figures as wrongful death awards are
broad and theoretical, whereas others are more focused on whether
the judicial use of VSLs satisfies the traditional economic criteria
for optimal damages: deterrence and risk spreading. We address
each argument in turn.
It is useful to note from the outset of this Section that the
discussion surrounding the use of VSLs in court has not, to date,
distinguished between market and community VSLs.147 To the
extent that the existing arguments against using VSLs as damages
rely on the sheer size of market VSLsand their tendency to inflate
damage awards to excessive levelssuch arguments are misguided
as applied to community VSLs. We agree with commentators who
claim that market VSLs, if used in court to determine damage
awards, would lead to overdeterrence and overinsurance.148 The
arguments below concern the use of community VSLs as damages
in wrongful death cases, which we endorse.
1. The Mismatch Argument: Small Risks Versus Entire Lives
One general argument against using values of a statistical life in
courtwhether such values are community values or market
valuesrevolves around the magnitude of the risks implicated by
VSL studies.149 According to the mismatch argument, VSL esti-
mates are inappropriate for compensation purposes because they
are not ex post measures of the value of an entire life; rather, they
reflect the value that individuals place on reducing small fatality
146. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 51, at 557.
147. See, e.g., id. at 543-44 (discussing the highly arbitrary ways in which courts
determine damages in wrongful death cases).
148. See, e.g., W. Kip Viscusi, Misuses and Proper Uses of Hedonic Values of Life in Legal
Contexts, 13 J. FORENSIC ECON. 111, 117 (2000).
149. See W. Kip Viscusi, The Flawed Hedonic Damages Measure of Compensation for
Wrongful Death and Personal Injury, 20 J. FORENSIC ECON. 113, 127, 129 (2007).
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risks.150 This argument doubles as a justification for the use of VSLs
in the regulatory context, in which the small risks valued by the
VSL are spread across the entire population.151 In short, VSLs
measure the way people trade off small risks, and, in the context of
regulation, the use of VSLs determines whether they will be exposed
to small risks.152 Because valuation of small risks bears little rela-
tion to the valuation of an entire life (or certain death), there is
allegedly a fundamental mismatch between the theory underlying
VSLs and the compensatory aim of tort awards.153
This argument, however, ignores the fact that damage awards act
in precisely the same fashion as regulations from the point of view
of potential (as opposed to actual) injurers. When a victim success-
fully sues an injurer, the damage award sends a deterrence signal
to other, similarly situated, potential injurers: obey the standard of
care or be subject to damages.154 The standard of care and the
damage awards, of course, jointly determine the level of risk that
the law will allow potential injurers to impose on potential
victims.155 This is the essence of ex ante regulationto specify the
appropriate levels of risk that the law will tolerate.156 Though tort
litigation forces small numbers of actual injurers to pay damages,
its more important role is to send a deterrence message to the
larger class of potential injurers and effectively regulate their
behavior.157 Because a central role of tort law is the management of
risks, it makes perfect sense to use VSLsa measure of community
approaches to riskas a measure of damages.
The arguments against using VSLs in court take the notion of
compensation too seriously in a context in which it is incoherent. As
explained in Part I, no amount of money can make a dead person
whole, and the same may be true of serious bodily injury. Some
commentators have interpreted this fact to suggest that full com-
pensatory damages for death would be infinite.158 Conversely, some
150. See id. at 117, 130-31.
151. See id. at 117.
152. See id. at 114.
153. Id. at 117.
154. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 51, at 553-56.
155. See id.
156. See id.
157. See id.
158. See id. at 556 (How should we think about valuing the loss of life? One thought is
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courts respond to this problem by refusing to award damages for a
life at all, opting instead to limit wrongful death awards to
economic damages.159 The better approach is to discard the idea of
compensation in the context of serious injury and death. Because
damages cannot, in principle, compensate for some injuries, it
makes sense to analyze the incentive effects that VSL damages
would provide. The standard economic framework for damages
revolves around the twin goals of deterrence and risk spreading,
discussed below.
2. Deterrence
The principal reasons for adopting community VSLs as damage
awards in cases of death are optimal deterrence and fairness.
Community VSLs set liability equal to the social cost of risky behav-
ior, as inferred from social norms of precaution.160 In doing so,
community VSLs provide incentives for rational injurers to follow
social norms of precaution or, in some cases, their quantitative
equivalent.161 In the preceding Section, we provided a pair of exam-
ples showing that, by linking the community standard of care with
damage awards, community VSLs lead to optimal deterrence and
avoid misalignments.
Kip Viscusia prolific scholar in the area of risk regulation and
empirical VSL studiesis, perhaps, the most vocal critic of the use
of VSL estimates in court.162 One of his principal arguments is that
the use of VSL estimates in tort cases would lead to overdeterrence
because damages are not the only source of accident deterrence:
that the loss of life should be valued at infinity because most people would not accept any
amount of money in exchange for their lives.).
159. See, e.g., N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-4.3 cmt. (McKinney 2015) (noting that
courts have held that wrongful death losses must be pecuniary and may include loss of
support and services such as cooking, cleaning, driving, etc., measured by the cost of hiring
people to replace those services, but also that [n]o damages are awardable for the grief or
suffering of the distributee or the lost companionship, comfort or assistance the decedent
would have provided (citing Protzman v. State, 458 N.Y.S.2d 408 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982), and
Bumpurs v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 527 N.Y.S.2d 217 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988))).
160. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 51, at 554-55.
161. See id.
162. See, e.g., Viscusi, supra note 148; W. Kip Viscusi, The Value of Life in Legal Contexts:
Survey and Critique, 2 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 195 (2000).
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For risks involving a market exchange these [additional sources
of deterrence] will be effects of accidents on peoples willingness
to buy dangerous products or work on risky jobs. Accidents in-
volving strangers, such as most auto accidents, may lead to
revision of a drivers insurance rates after an accident. For acci-
dents involving strangers as well as those involving market
exchanges, there are often incentives provided by government
regulations, ranging from traffic tickets to regulatory sanc-
tions.163
Accordingly, the view that VSLs would provide optimal deterrence
is unduly tort-centric and incomplete.
Ultimately, though, the argument that insurance rate adjust-
ments, regulatory sanctions, and price effects in the case of prod-
ucts liability are reliable sources of deterrence is unpersuasive for
several reasons. First, and most important, all of the intermediate
institutions Viscusi cites as sources of deterrence presuppose
damages that adequately capture the relevant losses. It is unclear
how, for example, insurance rates could properly adjust if the rates
do not reflect the underlying losses. The same can be said of prices
in the context of strict liability: markets for potentially dangerous
products will properly price risk only when, among other things,
the value of the underlying losses is internalized by the producer/in-
jurer. As with insurance rates, if the valuation of harm arising from
risky products is inadequate, the deterrence signal will be similarly
inadequate; as a result, uninformed consumers will continue buy-
ing the (improperly priced) product to an inefficient extent.
Relying on regulations as a consistent deterrence mechanism is
also misguided for several reasons, chiefly because regulatory sanc-
tions are largely unavailable in many contexts covered by tort law.
Car accidents, for example, are among the largest source of tortious
injuries,164 and individual drivers are not subject to regulatory
sanctions. Further, even when regulatory sanctions are available,
they bear no necessary relation to the harm caused. Rather, regu-
latory sanctions often come in the form of fines or injunctions.
163. Viscusi, supra note 149, at 121.
164. STEVENK.SMITH ETAL., BUREAUOFJUSTICESTATISTICS, DOJ, NO.NCJ-153177,TORT
CASES IN LARGE COUNTIES: CIVIL JUSTICE SURVEY OF STATE COURTS, 1992, at 2 tbl.1 (1995),
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/TCILC.pdf [https://perma.cc/UT9L-9W3G].
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In Viscusis words, the appropriateness of VSL figures in the
regulatory context flows precisely from their ability to establish ef-
ficient levels of risk based on community attitudes toward bearing
such risks.165 In fact, Viscusi endorses the use of VSL numbers in
the judicial context to determine precautionary standards (but not
damages) for this very reason.166 In our view, the standard of care
cannot be separated from the level of damages without causing mis-
alignments and giving mixed signals to potential injurers. Thus, the
appropriateness of community VSLs in the tort context flows from
precisely the same considerations cited by Viscusitheir ability to
establish efficient levels of health and safety risks based on ones
own attitude toward bearing these risks.167
3. Insurance and Optimal Risk Spreading
Viscusi also claims that the use of VSL numbers in court would
provide excessive insurance to accident victims.168 He argues that
because people would never purchase a level of insurance that
would yield a post-injury payout similar to the prevailing VSL
estimates, the tort system should not make such insurance com-
pulsory.169 In large part, Viscusis argument about excessive insur-
ance centers on the economic role of insurance and the marginal
utility of wealth in pre- and post-injury states:
[I]t would not be rational for an individual to buy an insurance
policy in which he or she in effect transferred income from the
healthy state to the injured state because doing so would
transfer income from the state in which the marginal utility of
income was high to the state where the marginal utility of
income was low. Thus, if the object is insurance and this is the
165. Viscusi, supra note 148, at 113.
166. See id. at 121.
167. Id. at 113.
168. See id. at 119-20. (From an economic standpoint, compensating people according to
the value-of-life estimates will provide too much insurance and this will be inefficient
generally. Moreover, in situations in which there are market transactions for hazardous
products or risky jobs, this high level of compensation will also generate burdens on con-
sumers and workers who will be in effect purchasing too much insurance through the higher
prices they pay and the lower wages they receive because of these excessive damages
levels.).
169. See id.
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only concern, then there is no rationale for pain and suffering
whatsoever.170
In light of the above, Viscusi concludes that although VSL numbers
are appropriate for regulatory use, they are undesirable as a mea-
sure of damages for wrongful death.171
For a number of reasons, however, the arguments against using
implied values of life in court are unconvincing. First, it bears
repeating that the arguments about excessive insurance challenge
the use of market VSLs rather than community VSLs. As discussed
above, market values of a statistical life are significantly larger
than community values of life: as much as three times larger.172
This fact alone takes much of the force out of the excessive insur-
ance argument.
Second, it is not entirely clear that the level of insurance assoc-
iated with VSL damages would be irrationalparticularly with
respect to community VSLs. Responding to similar excessive
insurance arguments in the context of noneconomic damages, a
number of commentators have noted that individuals might, in fact,
desire higher levels of insurance for pain and suffering if the
market were well equipped to provide it.173 Individuals inability to
fully envision a post-injury life,174 along with the informational
problems that would likely be associated with pain and suffering
insurance,175 may better explain its absence in the marketplace
than a lack of desire on the part of potential consumers. Moreover,
the lack of demand for pain and suffering insurance may be
attributable to the availability of such damages in tort: From the
potential buyers perspective, informed consumers know that pain
and suffering is compensable in tort cases .... Given that they thus
have a limited need for such coverage, its absence is not proof of its
lack of value.176
170. Id. at 120 (emphasis added).
171. See id. at 124.
172. See supra text accompanying note 8.
173. See, e.g., Croley & Hanson, supra note 46, at 1801-03; Ellen Smith Pryor, The Tort
Law Debate, Efficiency, and the Kingdom of the Ill: A Critique of the Insurance Theory of
Compensation, 79 VA. L. REV. 91, 100 (1993).
174. See Pryor, supra note 173, at 100.
175. See Croley & Hanson, supra note 46, at 1801-03.
176. Bovbjerg et al., supra note 34, at 933.
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Finally, and most important, Viscusis view that damages for
death and serious injury should be calculated with insurance con-
cerns at the forefront is debatable. As he and others have noted, it
is likely impossible to award damages for death and serious bodily
injury that are optimal from both an insurance and deterrence point
of view.177 Viscusi chooses to focus on the insurance function of
damages because courts focus in a retrospective manner and, in
the setting of damages, also have a compensation orientation.178 In
doing so, Viscusi equates insurance and damages: [I]f the question
being posed by the court is how much should the survivors be
compensated for the death of the person, that is a question pertain-
ing to insurance.179 As mentioned above, however, the concept of
compensation is virtually useless in the case of death and serious
bodily injury.
B. Regulatory Use of Community VSLs
Above, we made a case for the use of community VSLs in the tort
context. The arguments revolve around two broad themes: validity
and internal consistency. Community VSLs are validas a measure
of the implicit value of lifebecause they are derived from social
norms, which embody the collective preferences and ideals of com-
munities over time. Community VSLs offer internal consistency in
tort because they are inherently linked with the standards already
used by courts to determine reasonable precaution. At a minimum,
they are better guides to the value of life and limb than the unaided
intuitions of jurors.
In this Section, we extend the argument for community VSLs to
the regulatory context. This Section is brief, as many of the argu-
ments mirror those made in previous Sections. As in tort, the
reasons for using community VSLs as inputs to regulatory cost-ben-
efit analyses are validity and consistency. With respect to validity,
community VSLs are more reliable guides to the implicit value of
life than the market VSLs currently used in the regulatory context.
Further, the implicit values of life used in the regulatory context
177. See, e.g., Viscusi, supra note 148, at 116-17.
178. Id. at 113.
179. Id. at 116.
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should be consistent with the values used in other areas of law that
regulate risks, such as tort. We address the validity and consistency
issues in turn.
1. Validity
The regulatory use of VSLs appears, on its face, to be quite dif-
ferent than the role we envision for VSLs in tort. In the regulatory
context, VSLs serve as ex ante inputs to a regulatory cost-benefit
analysis; in tort, they serve as ex post guides to compensation.
However, both applications of VSLs advance a common purpose:
establishing prospective safety standards for potential injurers
engaging in risky activities. Put another way, tort litigation and
regulation, despite their various differences, are both commonly
understood as deterrence mechanisms.180
These two areas of law share a deterrence goal that requires a
method of valuing life. Regulators already use VSLs as a matter of
course, but they appear to rely chiefly on market VSLs rather than
community VSLs. In particular, regulatory agencies commonly use
results from labor market or wage premium studies to establish
the operational VSLs for their rules. For example, the Environmen-
tal Protection Agency (EPA) has relied on a series of studies by
Viscusi181and more recently, meta-analyses by Mrozek and Tay-
lor, Kochi et al., and Viscusi and Aldy182to inform its analyses. All
of these empirical analyses focus on labor market studies, meaning
that the underlying figures are what we call market VSLs rather
than community VSLs. Based on these studies, the EPA recom-
mends using a VSL of $6.3 million in year-2000 dollars.183 Similarly,
180. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Regulation (Agencies) Versus Litigation (Courts): An Ana-
lytical Framework, in REGULATIONVERSUSLITIGATION:PERSPECTIVES FROMECONOMICS AND
LAW 11, 11 (Daniel P. Kessler ed., 2010).
181. See, e.g., Lisa A. Robinson, How US Government Agencies Value Mortality Risk
Reductions, 1 REV. ENVTL. ECON. & POLY 283, 288 (2007).
182. See, e.g., CHRIS DOCKINS ET AL., EPA, VALUE OF STATISTICAL LIFE AND ENVIRON-
MENTAL POLICY:AWHITEPAPER11(2004),http://yosemite.epa.gov/ee/epa/eerm.nsf/vwAN/EE-
0483-01.pdf/$file/EE-0483-01.pdf [https://perma.cc/4BLE-3S2T].
183. See Robinson, supra note 181, at 288 (reporting a VSL of $7.2 million in year-2005
dollars). The VSL has been adjusted to year-2000 dollars for ease of comparison. The EPA
used twenty-six value-of-life studies to recommend a VSL of $4.8 million in year-1990 dollars
in its retrospective analyses of the Clean Water Act in 1997. See EPA, NO. EPA-410-R-97-
002, THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT: 1970 TO 1990, at 44 (1997). Robinsons
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the Federal Aviation Administration recommends a VSL of $5.8
million in year-2000 dollars, using the same studies cited by the
EPA.184 The range of VSLs used by the Food and Drug Administra-
tion (FDA) appears to center around $5 million,185 without specify-
ing a dollar year, though recent cost-benefit analyses have used
VSLs that are significantly higher$7.9 million186 and $6.4
million.187
For a variety of reasons, community VSLs are superior to market
VSLs as a measure of the value that we place on life. As discussed
in Part II, community values are derived from injunctive social
norms: rules of social conduct that are refined over time by
communities rather than individuals. Social norms are also
aspirational in nature, meaning that individual lapses in behavior
do not change them. In short, social norms are ideal behaviors
rather than average behaviors. The collective and deliberative
nature of social norms therefore provides a check against extreme,
imprudent, uninformed, or unduly selfish behaviors.
By contrast, market VSLs are imperfect expressions of individual
preferences in imperfect markets. As catalogued by the behavioral
economics literature, individuals have finite cognitive capacities,
exhibit inconsistent preferences, and suffer from various biases that
undermine the reliability of individual market behavior.188 For
example, in the context of labor market VSL studies, individuals
facing the health/wealth tradeoff may not understand the risks they
face:
work continues to form the basis of current EPA-recommended VSLs. Robinson, supra note
181, at 288.
184. See FED. AVIATION ADMIN., REVISED DEPARTMENTAL GUIDANCE: TREATMENT OF THE
VALUE OF PREVENTING FATALITIES AND INJURIES IN PREPARINGECONOMIC ANALYSES 4(2008).
185. See Robinson, supra note 181, at 293.
186. See FDA, Docket No. FDA-2011-F-0172, FOOD LABELING: NUTRITION LABELING OF
STANDARDMENUITEMS IN RESTAURANTS AND SIMILAR RETAIL FOOD ESTABLISHMENTS NOTICE
OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING: PRELIMINARY REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS 48 (2011).
187. See FDA, DOCKET NO.FDA-2011-F-0172, FOOD LABELING: NUTRITION LABELING OF
STANDARD MENU ITEMS IN RESTAURANTS AND SIMILAR RETAIL FOOD ESTABLISHMENTS FINAL
REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS 121 (2014).
188. See, e.g., Colin Camerer et al., Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics
and the Case for Asymmetric Paternalism, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211, 1215-18 (2003);
Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471,
1545 (1998); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing
the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1051, 1059 (2000).
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[T]he relevant [VSL] numbers deserve respect only if they do not
result from bounded rationality or an absence of information on
the part of the people whose choices generate them. Suppose, for
example, that workers do not know the risks that they face or
that their decisions are products of the availability heuristic or
optimistic bias. In either case, regulators should not use, for
purposes of policy, a finding that workers are paid $60 to run a
risk of 1/100,000; by hypothesis, that number does not reflect a
rational tradeoff by informed workers.189
Just as individuals depart from perfect rationality, markets de-
part from the ideal of perfect competition.190 For example, segmen-
tation in labor markets limits the mobility of workers, or their
ability to effectively choose a job with their preferred risk profile.
Such restrictions render their precaution choices, or risk/money
tradeoffs, less meaningful.191
Empirical scholars from within the VSL literature have voiced
concerns about the reliability of commonly reported market VSL
estimates. Interestingly, when statistical best practices are used
including better accounting for the source of risk and for variables
that account for individual risk perceptionsthe value of market
VSLs are significantly lower. A meta-analysis by Janusz Mrozek
and Laura Taylor, for example, analyzes forty VSL studies and
finds a plausible VSL range of $1.58-$2.64 million in year-2000
dollars when best practice assumptions are applied.192 A similar
analysis by Ted Miller finds a range of $2.98-$3.13 million, again in
year-2000 dollars.193 Another recent study finds that the range of
189. Cass R. Sunstein, Valuing Life: A Plea for Disaggregation, 54 DUKE L.J. 385, 403
(2004) (footnote omitted).
190. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 137
(2005) (Current practice is based on the assumption, not that all or even most workers make
informed choices, but that market processes ensure the right price for various degrees of
safety.).
191. See Joni Hersch & W. Kip Viscusi, Immigrant Status and the Value of Statistical Life,
45 J. HUM. RESOURCES 749, 770 (2010) (finding evidence of labor market segmentation due
to differences in language skills).
192. Janusz R. Mrozek & Laura O. Taylor, What Determines the Value of Life?A Meta-
Analysis, 21 J. POLY ANALYSIS & MGMT. 253, 268-69 (2002) (reporting a VSL range of $1.3-
$2.5 million in year-1998 dollars when best practices are applied). The VSL range has been
adjusted to year-2000 dollars for ease of comparison.
193. Miller, supra note 85, at 32 (reporting a range of $1.8-$2.2 million in year-1988
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market VSLs used in the regulatory context is inflated insofar as
they do not take into account publication bias.194 When all VSL
studies are analyzed, the authors of that study find an average mar-
ket VSL of $2.74 million in year-2000 dollars.195
All of the above estimates resemble the average community VSL,
as reflected in Table 3, and provide some support for the notion that
community VSLs merge with market VSLs when the decisions
underlying individual market choices are well informed. Practically
speaking, then, the adoption of community VSLs in the regulatory
context would have the same effect as adopting what many believe
are the most reliable market VSL estimates.
2. Consistency
In our arguments concerning the use of community VSLs in tort,
the meaning of  consistency was internal: precautionary standards
should match, or align with, damages. Because norms are already
often used as guideposts for reasonable precaution, we argue,
damages should be measured by the implicit values of life contained
in norms. Doing so would prevent misalignments and send clear
deterrence signals to potential injurers.
In this context, we use the concept of  consistency in a different
way. Specifically, we are concerned with consistency across areas
of law that engage in risk regulation. Because tort law and regu-
lation are both aimed at establishing tolerable behaviors and levels
of risk, tort and regulation should value life consistently.196 Failure
to value life consistently across tort and regulation can cause two
types of distortion. One type of distortion occurs when actors are
subject to both regulations and tort litigation, and another type of
distortion occurs when two activities that are partial (or full)
substitutes are regulated by different systems that rely on different
valuations.197
dollars). The VSL range has been adjusted to year-2000 dollars for ease of comparison.
194. Chris Doucouliagos et al., Are Estimates of the Value of a Statistical Life Exagger-
ated?, 31 J. HEALTH ECON. 197, 204 (2012).
195. Id.
196. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 51, at 561 (According to standard wisdom in law
and economics, tort law and regulatory law have redundant functions: both deter cost-
unjustified behavior.).
197. Id. at 562.
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In the former case, actors subject to both systems will be con-
fused as to the required behavior and may ultimately end up
conforming to the more stringentbut not necessarily more desir-
ablerequirements. For example, suppose regulations require an
actor to take specific ex ante precautions based on a market VSL
of $5 million. Suppose further that tort law values life erratically,
and the upper end of the distribution of tort awards for wrongful
death reaches well above $5 million. Uncertain of whether regula-
tory compliance will shield him from tort liability, the actor, in
addition to spending money to clarify this preemption issue, might
choose to engage in extra precaution. In this case, the (upper) tail
of the tort damage distribution wags the dog of precaution. Unless
we assume that the high end of the distribution of tort awards is
optimal, the actor in this case will be spending too many resources
on precaution.
In the latter situation, the inconsistent valuations of life across
tort and regulation will distort the market for various activities.
Posner and Sunstein provide an illustration:
Consider, for example, automobile travel, which is mainly but
not entirely regulated by the tort system (regulations affect the
design of cars and highways, too) and short-haul air travel,
which is mainly but not entirely regulated by agencies (tort law
also matters, of course). Suppose that agencies and tort law use
reasonable but different life valuations.... If tort law values vic-
tims less than regulatory law, thenall else equaldriving will
be cheaper than flying. So some people who would otherwise
prefer to fly will drive instead.... [It] would be better if they both
use the same valuation.198
The case for consistent valuation of life across tort and regula-
tion, importantly, avoids the larger debate about the relative merits
of the two systems in addressing certain types of problems. To be
sure, the two areas of law have certain comparative advantages in
the regulation of risky activities. We make no claims about the
range of activities that shouldor should notbe subject to
regulation or tort, nor do we make any claims about preemption.
198. Id. (emphasis omitted).
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Our narrow contention is that, wherever each of these two areas of
law applies, they should value life in a consistent manner.
CONCLUSION
In the regulatory context and in tort, placing a dollar value on life
is necessary. Currently, the tort system relies on the intuitions of
jurors to determine the effective value of life, while the regulatory
system relies on individual judgments made in the labor market.
We contend that community judgments about safetyas reflected
in precautionary social normsare superior guides to the implicit
value that we place on life. This conclusion is based on a particular
conception of norms: one that is more about idealized community
commitments than behavioral patterns or average conduct.
Adopting community VSLs in tort would make damages more
uniform and also align damages with standards of precaution
which, themselves, are often derived from social norms. If adopted
in tort, community VSLs should also be used in determining the
regulatory value of life; doing so would send clear, rather than
confusing, deterrence signals to potential injurers whose activities
are governed by both areas of law.
Based on the limited pool of empirical estimates that would count
as community VSLs under our definition, adopting community
VSLs in tort would approximately double current damage awards.
Adopting community VSLs in the regulatory context would reduce
regulatory values of life by about two-thirds. The community VSL
magnitudes reported here are, of course, tentative. Social norms of
precaution are constantly shifting, so the community VSLs derived
from them are something of a moving target. Future empirical stud-
ies that focus on the community/market could also yield different
results than our initial (and limited) analysis.
If our empirical findings concerning the relative magnitude of
community and market VSLs do hold up in future research, this
counterintuitive result presents avenues for future research.199
199. One potential explanation for why community VSLs are smaller than their market
counterparts is that social norms carve out minimum (rather than maximum) standards of
civility. Thus, it makes sense that community values of life implied by social norms are
smaller than average values in some cases. Everyone can agree that certain precautions need
to be taken, but as the cost increases, there is more disagreement and a social norm may be
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Intuitively, one might expect communities to be more cautious than
individuals, making market VSLs smaller than community VSLs.
We find the opposite, though, and comprehending this result ad-
vances our understanding of each of the measures and their
appropriate uses. However the magnitudes of community and mar-
ket VSLs ultimately stack up, the theory behind our claimsthat
communities are better suited to make such judgments than in-
dividuals or jury membersmakes sense in terms of fairness,
efficiency, and consistency.
hard to form. Another explanation involves the willingness-to-accept/willingness-to-pay (or
WTA/WTP) gap. People ask more to part with a good than they are willing to pay for it, so
WTP values are consistently less than WTA values. Market VSLs are largely WTA amounts,
whereas the community VSLs we identify in this Article are mostly WTP amounts; this
technical difference could explain the difference in magnitudes between the two measures.
Finally, differences in the mean risk levels used in the market and community VSL studies
may also be partially responsible for the divergence.

